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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

BRENT D. YOUNG,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vsSALT LAKE COUNTY AND AARON
D. KENNARD SALT LAKE COUNTY
SHERIFF,

Court Case No. 20010101-SC
Category No. 15

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Article 8, §3
of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the court have jurisdiction to hear Young's request for judicial review pursuant

to §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) when that request was made more than 35 days after Young's original
request for records to the governmental entity?
1

2.

Did Young's request present a matter in controversy over which the district

court had jurisdiction as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a)?
3.

Does Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19 bar the release of un-appealed disciplinary

records?
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED
1) Whether the court had jurisdiction to hear Young's request for judicial review
pursuant to §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) was raised and considered in both parties motions for
summary judgment. R. 84,93 and 153. The matter was argued and considered before the trial
court on September 19, 2000. Addendum C T. pages 12-13.
2) Whether Young's request dealt with a matter in controversy over which the court
had jurisdiction as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) was briefed by Appellee in
their request for the records. R. 57-58. The argument presented was addressed during oral
argument. Addendum C T. pages 6, 8, 10 and 30. In addition, Appellant argued indirectly
that the court was without statutory authority because GRAMA could not circumvent the
civil discovery process and Young's request was not ripe for consideration. Addendum C.
T. pages 20-21 and 23, 26, 40 and 41.
3) Whether Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19 bars the release of un-appealed disciplinary
records was raised in Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 85, 89-91 and 95-97.
This matter was argued and considered by the trial judge on September 19,2000. Addendum
C, T. pages 4, 6, 13-17 , 20 and 37-38.

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appeal from a grant of summary judgment is reviewed for "correctness". The
court's conclusions of law receive no deference. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994). The court's factual findings are considered in a light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion was made. A.C. Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 784
(Utah 1997).
Each issue stated above is an issue of law. As such, each is reviewed under the
"correctness" standard. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to a determination of these issues: Utah Code
Ann. §63-2-101, et seq; Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii);Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(ae); Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404, et seq.; Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207; Utah Code Ann. §63-2304, et seq.; The full text of these provisions are found in Addendum A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellee (hereinafter referred to as "Young") was a deputy with the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office. R. 49 and 92. Concurrent with his use of the Deputy Sheriffs Merit
Commission process, he served a request for records on the governmental entity (Salt Lake
County) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-101 et seq. (Government Records Access
Management Act) or (GRAMA). R. 50, 92, 102. Young's request under GRAMA, sought
the disciplinary records of third party officers and Internal Affairs investigative files which

3

involve allegations of sexual activity or inappropriate use of a firearm. Salt Lake County
denied Young access to these records. R. 50 and R. 89.
Young filed a request for judicial review of the agency's decision. R. 23-26. The
matter was presented to the district court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The
district court determined that Young was entitled to receive the un-appealed disciplinary
records of other deputies and he was entitled to receive the Sheriffs Office internal
investigative files which involve allegations of sexual activity or inappropriate use of a
firearm. R. 166-169 To protect the privacy interests of the officers named in the files, the
County was ordered to redact the names and identifying information prior to the release.
R.169
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The trial court heard oral argument on the parties' motions for summary judgment.
The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and granted Young summary
judgment. Addendum B. The Court found that Young's right to the information does not
outweigh the privacy interests of third parties that may be contained in the requested records.
Based upon this finding, the court ordered the County to redact the identity of the party
mentioned in the records or information that would reasonably lead to the disclosure of a
party's identity.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Brent Young was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office when he was
terminated for a violation of Sheriff's Office Policy and Procedures. R. 49. Young sought an
4

administrative review of the Sheriff's decision. R. 49-50 While pursuing his administrative
appeal. Young made a request to the district court for the disciplinary records of third parties.
R. 50. In addition, Young made a request for the same records under GRAMA. R. 88-89.
After reviewing Young's request for records, the custodian of records denied Young's
request. R. 50. On March 28, 2000, Young appealed the denial to the Chief Administrative
Officer of Sheriff's Department pursuant to the statute. R. 50. The Chief Administrative
Officer did not respond within the 5 day period provided in Utah Code Ann. §63-2401(5)(a)(i). R. 50 and R. 89. By statute, the appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer was
deemed denied by the Officer's failure to respond timely. R. 89 and 93.
On April 20,2000, however, the Chief Administrative Officer responded to Young's
request by providing additional information but denying Young's request for the un-appealed
disciplinary files and the Internal Affairs investigative files. R. 50, and 88-89.
On May 16,2000,49 days after Young's appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer,
Young filed a request for judicial review. R. 1-22. The amended complaint on file with the
court is Young's request for judicial review of the County's denial of his request for records
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404. R. 23-26. The amended complaint also requests
attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-802(2)(a). Amended complaint, J 13 and
Plaintiffs prayer for relief^ 2. Young's request for attorney's fees was denied in the trial
court and he has not appealed that ruling. R. 267.

5

Young was provided with the records that support the disciplinary action taken against
him and disciplinary records of other deputies who appealed their discipline. R. 16-20 and R.
85. Young's GRAMA request included two additional types of records. Young requested the
disciplinary records of other deputies when discipline imposed was not appealed by the
deputy and concerned allegations of sexual activity by a deputy or use of a firearm. R. 6. An
employee disciplinary file consists of a letter indicating the charges or policy violations
against a deputy and the intended discipline to be imposed. The County denied Young's
request for the un-appeal disciplinary records because Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19(2)(a)(ii)
prohibits the release of un-appealed disciplinary records. R. 16-20. In addition, the Sheriff
has internal policies which inform employees that un-appealed disciplinary records are
private. See Addendum F for Sheriff's Office Policy 2-4-06.03(4) and R. 134.
Young also requested and was denied access to Sheriff's Office investigative files.
R. 6. And R. 16-20. These files are created when the Sheriff receives a complaint or
information that warrants an investigation. Investigative records can contain everything
beginning with investigations of petty disputes and rumors to egregious crimes and felonies.
Therefore, they contain information which is both highly private and personal to any person
who has knowingly or unknowingly been the subject of an investigation. R. 98 and R. 100.
The Sheriffs annual report indicates that Internal Affairs investigates approximately 200
claims per year. Young's request would require the agency to search through over 2,000 files
to determine which files deal with sexual activity or a firearm allegation.

6

Young requested all investigative files relating to the inappropriate use of a firearm
or sexual activity of a deputy. This request was denied because those records are properly
classified as "protected documents" under the Government Records Access Management
Act, and they contain private information the district court and County believe warrants the
court's protection. R. 16-20.
The Third District Court heard this case on cross-motions for summary judgment. The
court acknowledged the third party privacy interests raised by the County. T. pg. 45 at
Addendum C. The court's order on the parties' motions for summary judgment is attached
as Addendum B. During oral argument the County raised concerns that the release of unappealed disciplinary records violated Utah Code Ann.§ 17-30- 19(2)(a)(ii) and the district
court was without authority under the Government Records Access Management Act to order
the release of un-appealed disciplinary records. See T. 16 -17 at Addendum C. Additionally,
the County pointed out that the Government Records Access Management Act was not
intended to circumvent other discovery processes nor does it give independent authority to
order the release of the requested records. See T. 40-41, at Addendum C.
Although Young has a pending administrative matter with the Deputy Sheriff's Merit
Commission, this appeal concerns his efforts to gain access to government records through
another means. This appeal does not alter the proceedings before the Deputy Sheriff s Merit
Commission. The Deputy Sheriff s Merit Commission has independent authority to subpoena
records and has not exercised its authority to release these records. Utah Code Ann. §17-3021. The Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission has inspected the records in camera and has
:

. 1

determined that it will proceed without releasing the records. See Addendum D. At Young's
request, the Deputy Sheriff s Merit Commission continued their proceedings until this matter
is resolved.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Young's request for judicial review was untimely. GRAMA provides three separate
appeal periods, 30, 35 and 45 days from the agency's denial or failure to respond. Young
failed to meet any of these statutory time requirements in order for the district court to
consider the merits of his request for judicial review. The district court lacked jurisdiction
to hear Young's request.
Assuming the court finds a right to exercise jurisdiction, the district court was required
to determine if the requested records were appropriately classified as protected documents.
In doing so, the district court was required to follow the analysis set forth in Utah Code §632-202(7)(a-e) prior to issuing an order to release the records. The first prong of this analysis
requires a finding by the district court that the requested records deal with a matter in
controversy over which the court has jurisdiction. The records requested by Young were not
embroiled in a matter in controversy over which the district court had jurisdiction. The Salt
Lake County Deputy Sheriff s Merit Commission had jurisdiction over Young's termination,
which is the matter in controversy. It was clear error for the district court to proceed through
the five step analysis when it could not meet the jurisdiction requirement set forth in statute
because the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter in controversy. Without jurisdiction over
Young's termination, the district court could not order the release of a record properly
classified as protected.
8

In addition, the district court incorrectly interpreted Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e)
as providing it with authority to release the un-appealed disciplinary records. These records
are specifically covered by another state statute. Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) states
that un-appealed disciplinary records will remain private. It was clear error for the district
court to order the release of the un-appealed disciplinary records and the court's order should
be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.
YOUNG'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW WAS
UNTIMELY PURSUANT TO §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii).
A timely appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii), is a jurisdictional
requirement. Specifically, the statute mandates that a party file their petition for judicial
review within 35 days if the governmental entity fails to respond. The statute states:
"(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than:
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request
by either providing the requested records or denying the request in whole or
in part;
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to
respond to the request1; or

i

Before a claimant is allowed to seek judicial review of a governmental agency's
decision regarding records access he must first appeal to entity's decision to the chief
administrative officer. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401(1) (2001). Upon receipt of the claimant's
appeal the chief administrative officer has 5 days to respond to the claimant with a
determination of his claim. Id. §63-2-401(5). If the officer does not respond within 5 days
the claimant's appeal is deemed to have been denied and accordingly he has 30 days to
petition for further administrative or judicial review. Id. §63-2-402.
9

(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if:
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401 (l)(b) occur;
and
(B) The chief administrative officer failed to make a determination
under Section 63-2-401. " Id.
Young filed his administrative appeal on March 28, 2000. R. 3, fl 1; R. 12; R. 89, f
4; R. 167. The County did not respond to his request within its mandated five day period
which by statutory operation denies the request. Id. §63-2-401 (5)(b). R. 3, <][12; R. 16; R. 89,
f 4. Because of this statutory denial, Young had 35 days from the date of his initial filling to
petition for judicial review by the district court. On April 20, 2000, the County sent Young
notice of its denial. R. 16; R. 167. Young's receipt of a letter of denial, nineteen days after
the statutory five day limit, did not enlarge his appeal period. Retherford v. Industrial Comm.,
739 P.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an administrative body's further reconsideration
of it's own decision did not extend or toll the claimant's statutory responsibility to petition
for judicial review once the statutory period began). As the Utah Court of Appeals held in
Retherford, the time limits of jurisdiction of the administrative judicial bodies are, "fixed by
statute" and therefore any action that exceeds those time limits are void. Id. at 12, citing
Schocknmyer v. Industrial Commission, 463 P.2d 562 (Utah 1970). Under Utah case
authority and the statutory period found in Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401(5) Young's request
for judicial review was untimely, and improperly considered and granted by the district court.
Young's argument that the April 20,2000 letter extends the time period for requesting
judicial review is contrary to Utah case law. The Utah Supreme Court considered a similar

10

argument in Harper Investments, Inc. v. Auditing Division, Utah State Tax Commission, 868
P.2d 813 (Utah 1994). In that case, the Tax Commission argued to the Court that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear Harper Companies appeal because it missed the statutory deadline for
obtaining judicial review. The provision at issue in Harper required a request for review to
be filed within thirty days from the date the agency decision is issued or deemed to have been
issued. Harper at 815. The court in Harper found the appeal timely because the agency had
authority to reconsider its decision.
The Government Records Management Act has no similar provision for
reconsideration. Therefore, the County, acting through the Sheriffs Office, is without
authority to reconsider the request unless the agency could meet the requirements for
extenuating circumstances pursuant Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)(iii). This subsection
provides an extra ten days to respond before the request is deemed denied if extenuating
circumstances are present. Because there were no extenuation circumstances, Young's appeal
to the Chief Administrative Officer is deemed denied after 5 days. Neither party claims the
County meets the requirements set forth for extenuating circumstances, and the extra ten days
are no benefit to Young because his appeal is beyond the 45 day requirement set forth in
subsection (iii) for extenuating circumstances.
Unlike the provisions with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act which permits
state agencies governed by that act to exercise continuing jurisdiction, the Government
Records Management Act does not provide the agency authority to exercise continuing

11

jurisdiction. A finding by this Court of continuing jurisdiction would render the third
subsection of Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b) meaningless. Therefore, in order to provide
full meaning to all three subsections contained at Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b), each
subsection must be interpreted to provide a limit to the agency's authority to respond.
Applying the statutory 5 day response period, Young's appeal to the agency was deemed
denied on April 1,2000. To invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, Young had to file no
later than May 1, 2000. Because he did not, the district court was without jurisdiction to
consider his request for judicial review.
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION
OVER THE CONTROVERSY WHICH PREVENTED THE ISSUANCE
OF AN ORDER RELEASING A PROTECTED RECORD.
When a request for judicial review comes before the district court, the judge must first
determine if the record was properly classified by the government agency. In this case, the
County classified both types of records as "protected documents". Utah Code Ann. §63-2202. Although this classification was disputed by Young, who argued the records were public
documents, the district court supported the agencies classification. R. 51-54; R. 61. Young
had the burden of contesting the County's classification. Young argued that since the
investigations were complete the documents became public records. R. 51-54 and T. pg. 3
at Addendum C. The district court's findings do not dispute the protected classification.
Addendum B, page 2, f 3. In fact, the findings acknowledge the privacy interests of third
persons, a fact which justifies the protected classification used by the County. Addendum B,
12

page 3, f6. Had the district court supported Young's contention that the records were public,
the district court could immediately order the records released without further analysis.
Instead, the district court used Utah Code §63-2-202(7) which permits the court, under
certain circumstances, to order the release of protected records2.
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7) (a)-(d) provides the requirements to issuing an order
for the release of properly classified documents to persons not otherwise authorized by the
statute. The first requirement that the court must address is whether the requested records
deal with a matter in controversy over which the court has jurisdiction.
In the district court proceeding Section 63-2-202(7)(a) was addressed by the County
in two ways. First, the County argued that GRAMA was not intended to circumvent the civil
discovery process, citing Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207. In reviewing the legislative history of
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207, it is clear that in 1992 the sponsor of H.B.400 originally
requested language which would prevent party litigants from requesting records from a
governmental entity relating to the subject matter of litigation3.
As a second point, the County argued that to permit the district court to order the
release of records for the specific purpose of using the requested information in an
2

Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7) (a) acts as a gate keeping provision.
Appellee briefed and argued that the jurisdiction requirement was met. Although,
Appellant did not directly address the issue below, it would be plain error for a trial court
to ignore the jurisdictional requirement within the statute. Davis v. Grand County, 905
P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995).
3

See H.B.400 submitted by Rep. Marty Stephens in 1992, footnote 11.
Chapter 280, Laws of Utah (1992)
13

administrative proceeding violated the doctrine of ripeness4.
The doctrine of ripeness prevents a trial court from considering issues which are
contingent on future events which may not occur. See State v. Ortiz J 999 UT 84, 987 P.2d
39 for a full discussion of the doctrine of ripeness.
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7) (a) requires that the requested records "deal with a
matter in controversy over which the court has jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7)
(a), (2000). In the case of Young, a controversy over which the court had jurisdiction was
not present because his matter was presently pending before the Deputy Sheriffs Merit
Commission. The district court was without authority to order the release of a properly
classified record when the statute did not specifically make an exception for Young's request
nor did the court have a matter before it in which it could issue an order pursuant the
requirements set forth at Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7)(a-e).
Although this particular subsection of GRAMA has not been interpreted by the
appellate courts of this state, its meaning is clear. The district court ignored the statutory
prerequisite to issuing an order releasing a protected document. Essentially, the district court
was without authority to order the release of a properly classified document. Utah Code Ann.
§63-2-202(7)(a) was drafted to prevent the district court from releasing protected documents,
when no matter in controversy is presently pending before the judge. Additional support for

4

Young had already made the same request to the Deputy Sheriffs Merit
Commission and at the time of the district court hearing the Commission had not yet ruled
upon Young's request.
14

this interpretation can be found in case law defining the phrase "jurisdiction over a matter
in controversy" Washington County v. State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 73, 133 P.2d 564
(Utah 1943); State v. Third Judicial Dist. Ct. 27 Utah 336, 75 P. 739 (Utah 1904); (writ of
prohibition will not issue when the lower court has jurisdiction over the matter in
controversy) and Cast v. Cast 1 Utah 112, (Utah Terr., 1871) (discussed statute which
limited the probate court's jurisdiction "provided that they shall not have jurisdiction of any
matter in controversy" when title or boundaries are at issue.).
GRAMA sets out the specific criteria that government agencies must meet in order
to classify documents as "protected". Only when the government agency can satisfy the
statutory requirements for classifying a record as "protected" can it restrict access
accordingly. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-304. Protected records can be shared with other
governmental agencies pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-206 and provided to the persons
identified in Utah Code Ann. §63-2-203(4). Most importantly, a protected record can be
disclosed pursuant to a court order. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7). However, the first
limitation on receiving a court order is that the requested record must deal with a matter over
which the court has jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a)
When a requestor, who does not meet the statutory requirements for obtaining a
protected document, seeks judicial review, they are limited to an analysis of the agency's
classification. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a). If the classification is correct, the requestor
is bound by the agency's classification of the document unless the court with jurisdiction
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over the matter in controversy issues an order releasing the document. Utah Code Ann. §63-2202(7)(a). This section is intended to require persons seeking records over which there is a
matter in controversy to present that request to the body with current jurisdiction over the
controversy. See Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207(2)(b). To read the statute any other way renders,
either Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) or Utah Code Ann.§63-2-207(2)(b) inoperable.
When faced with a question of statutory construction, the court looks first to plain language
of the statute. Guiterrez v. Medlv. 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 1998). A statute should be
construed as a whole, with all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other.
Lieber v. ITT Harford Ins. Center, Inc.. 200 UT 90, 15 P.3d 1030.
To give consistent meaning and harmony to both Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207(2)(b)
and Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a), Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) must be read to limit
the court's jurisdiction to matters over which it has current jurisdiction. To read Utah Code
Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) as giving the court jurisdiction with every request for judicial review
would provide no meaning to the jurisdictional sections of GRAMA . Furthermore, it would
disregard the intent of Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207(2)(a)(i) and (ii) making non-disclosed
records privileged until otherwise ordered.
Young's primary argument to the district court was that without access to these
records he would be denied a due process hearing before the Deputy Sheriffs Merit
Commission. R. 52-63; R. 151-162 and T. 31-32 at Addendum C. The district court based
its decision to release the records on Young's right to due process in a proceeding before the
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Deputy Sheriff s Merit Commission. R. 168, <j[ 2.; T. pg. 45 at Addendum C. When the district
court made its decision, the Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission had not ruled on Young's
request for records or their potential use in their administrative proceeding.5 T. pg. 45 at
Addendum C. The district court prematurely determined Young's need for the requested
records when the matter was clearly pending before an administrative body with statutory
jurisdiction. This situation demonstrates the basis for requiring the requested records to deal
with a matter over which the court has jurisdiction. Without this requirement, a litigant at the
administrative level could circumvent the authority of the administrative body and prevent
the timely adjudication by appealing records issues to the district court in advance of a
decision by the administrative body. Likewise, if Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) is not read
to require the court to have jurisdiction over the matter in controversy, then there is the

5

The transcript hearing for the motion for summary judgment contains the following
language indicating the merits upon which the district court Judge relied in issuing his
bench ruling:
"And my immediate reaction in this case has been that the, the administrative
remedies have not been exhausted and that the plaintiff should go back as far as the
Merit Commission is concerned and have a hearing and yet I cannot get around the
basic understanding that in any case a person is entitled to due process up front. I
can't understand how in a criminal case a person can go to trial with out receiving due
process and receive the discovery and the information, and even if I deny the request,
allow it go back, then it's just going to come back here before, again, if due process
is alleged and then, of course, the he has the burden of proving that due process was
not granted.
I'll, the Court is of the opinion and I so rule that the plaintiff is entitled to the
records asked for and I specifically say, as asked for, with the material redacted. I
think the right of privacy is more, more important in this situation that the due process
of the plaintiff, and if there's information that is going to disclose who these infer, the
other officers were, I, of course I want that definitely out."
17

potential for inconsistent orders from two separate district court judges, the first with
jurisdiction over the controversy and the second with jurisdiction over the GRAMA request.
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) should be read to require jurisdiction over the
matter in controversy prior to issuance of an order. The district court failed to meet this
requirement and was prevented by the statute from issuing its order.

in.
UTAH CODE ANN. §17-30-19 PROHIBITS THE RELEASE OF
UN-APPEALED DISCIPLINARY RECORDS
As a sworn deputy with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Young's
employment was governed by the Deputy Sheriffs Merit Act. Utah Code Ann. §17-30-1
et seq. When a sworn deputy is subject to disciplinary action by the Sheriffs department,
the person ordering the discipline shall "file written charges with the commission; and
serve the officer with a copy of the charges". The charging document consists of a letter
to the deputy notifying him of allegations, policy violations and intended disciplinary
action. The deputy has a right to appeal the charge to the commission. Utah Code Ann.
§17-30-19 (2)(a)(l).
Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) specifically provides that; "(ii) In the
absence of an appeal, a copy of the charges under Subsection (1) may not be made public
without the consent of the officer charged". Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii), (2000).
Young appealed the decision to terminate his employment. As part of his appeal
hearing, Young requested from the Sheriffs department the un-appealed disciplinary
records of other deputies. The County denied his request because in the absence of an
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administrative appeal the records may not be released without the consent of the deputy
that was the subject of the discipline. Young does not argue that he has obtained consent
of the other deputies. Instead, he claims a due process right to have access to and use of
these records before the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission during his administrative
appeal.
When the district court considered Young's request for the un-appealed
disciplinary records, the County informed the court that Utah Code Ann. §17-3019(2)(a)(ii) governed the release of these records and GRAMA requires the district court
to comply with Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a-e) prior to ordering the release of a
protected record. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e) provides in pertinent part
as follows;
" where access is restricted by a rule, statute, or regulation referred to in
Subsection 63-2-20l(3)(b), the court has authority independent of this chapter to
order disclosure."
Subsection 63-2-20 l(3)(b) addresses "records to which access is restricted pursuant to
court rule, another state statute,...." Utah Code Ann.§17-30- 19(2)(b)(ii) is a state statute
that restricts the release of un-appealed disciplinary records.
Since Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7)(e) requires that when another statute restricts
access the court must have authority independent of GRAMA to release the record, the
district court was required to identify its authority to release the un-appealed disciplinary
records of deputies.
The County argued before the trial court that Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19
prohibited the release of the un-appealed disciplinary records and the court was without
19

authority to order their release. R. 95-97; R. 132. No evidence was before the trial court
that another statute authorized the release of un-appealed disciplinary records. Therefore,
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e), read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. §17-3019(2)(b)(ii), is controlling and prohibits the release of the un-appealed disciplinary
records.
Before the district court, Young asserted only a right to due process in a collateral
administrative matter, as the basis for his request for the disciplinary records. R. 52-63
and R. 151-162. The County therefore requests this Court to reverse the decision of trial
court for its failure to appropriately apply the standards set forth at §63-2-202 (7)(e).
Specifically, that it was clear error to release the un-appealed disciplinary records of other
deputies in contradiction to Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii).
CONCLUSION
A timely appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401 (5)(a)(i), is a jurisdictional
requirement which Young failed to meet. Young's request was deemed denied after 5
days pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-40l(5)(b)(l), and after 35 days the court was
without jurisdiction to hear Young's request for judicial review.
Going beyond the court's lack of jurisdiction, this court should find that the district
court failed to interpret Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) as requiring it to have
jurisdiction over the parties' controversy. It was error for the district court to order the
release of records that deal with a matter over which it had no jurisdiction. Such an order,
violates Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) and should be reversed.
Addressing the release of the un-appealed disciplinary records, it was error for the
20

district court to order their release. The statutory language contained in Utah Code Ann.
§17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) is controlling and prevents the trial court from releasing unchallenged
disciplinary actions pursuant to a GRAMA request.
In conclusion, this Court should find that the trial court was without jurisdiction to
hear Young's request for judicial review and dismiss this matter. In the alternative, this
Court should find that Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) prevented the district court from
issuing an order for the release of records and that Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) is
controlling and specifically prevents the release of unchallenged disciplinary records of
sworn officers.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The district court acted without jurisdiction when it considered Young's request
for these records. The inherently private nature of these files is worthy of protection by
this court. The district court's decision circumventing the jurisdiction of the
administrative body and ultimately releasing records without statutory authority is an
issue that should be fully considered by this court. The County believes that oral argument
on the issues presented will assist the court in resolving the issues presented.
DATED this <ZJ_ day of August, 2001.
DAVID E.YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney
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VALERIE M. WILDE
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellants
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ADDENDUM A

17-30-19. Disciplinary charges and officer grievances
— Appeal to commission — Hearing — Findings.
(1) Each person who orders the demotion, reduction in pay,
suspension, or discharge of a merit system officer for any cause
«t forth in Section 17-30-18 shall:
(a) file written charges with the commission; and
(b) serve the officer with a copy of the written charges.
(2) (a) (i) An officer who is the subject of charges under
Subsection (1) may, within ten days after service of
the charges, appeal in writing to the commission.
(ii) In the absence of an appeal, a copy of the
charges under Subsection (1) may not be made public
without the consent of the officer charged,
(b) If an officer files a grievance, as defined by the
commission, and exhausts all internal grievance procedures, if any, the officer may, within ten days after
receiving notice of the final disposition of the grievance,
file an appeal with the commission.
(3) (a) The commission shall:
(i) fix a time and place for a hearing upon the
charges or appeal of the officer grievance; and
(ii) give notice of the hearing to the parties,
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b)(ii), each
hearing under this Subsection (3) shall be held not
less than ten and not more than 90 days after an
appeal or grievance is filed.
(ii) A hearing may be held more than 90 days after
an appeal or grievance is filed if:
(A) the officer and employer agree; or
(B) for good cause the commission so orders.
(4) (a) If the aggrieved officer so desires, the hearing shall
be public,
(b) The parties may be represented by counsel at the
hearing.
(5) After the hearing the commission shall make its decision in writing, including findings of fact, and shall mail a copy
to each party.
2000
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53-2-902.
63-2-903.
53-2-904.
$3-2-905.
53-2-906.
03-2-907.
03-2-908.
53-2-909.

State archivist — Duties.
Duties of governmental entities.
Rulemaking authority.
Records declared property of the state — Disposition.
Certified and microphotographed copies.
Right to replevin.
Inspection and summary of record series.
Records made public after 75 years.
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

03-2-101. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Government Records Access
and Management Act."
1991
03-2-102. Legislative intent.
(1) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two
constitutional rights:
(a) the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business; and
(b) the right of privacy in relation to personal data
gathered by governmental entities.
(2) The Legislature also recognizes a public policy interest
in allowing a government to restrict access to certain records,
as specified in this chapter, for the public good.
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to:
(a) promote the public's right of easy and reasonable
access to unrestricted public records;
(b) specify those conditions under which the public
interest in allowing restrictions on access to records may
outweigh the public's interest in access;
(c) prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental
entities by permitting confidential treatment of records
only as provided in this chapter;
(d) provide guidelines for both disclosure and restrictions on access to government records, which are based on
the equitable weighing of the pertinent interests and
which are consistent with nationwide standards of information practices;
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this
act, countervailing interests are of equal weight; and
(f) establish fair and reasonable records management
practices.
1992
63-2-103. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Audit" means:
(a) a systematic examination of financial, management, program, and related records for the purpose of
determining the fair presentation of financial statements, adequacy of internal controls, or compliance
with laws and regulations; or
(b) a systematic examination of program procedures and operations for the purpose of detennining
their effectiveness, economy, efficiency, and compliance with statutes and regulations.
(2) "Chronological logs" mean the regular and customary summary records of law enforcement agencies and
other public safety agencies that show the time and
general nature of police, fire, and paramedic calls made to
the agency and any arrests or jail bookings made by the
agency.
(3) "Classification," "classify," and their derivative
forms mean determining whether a record series, record,
or information within a record is public, private, con-
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trolled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b).
(4) (a) "Computer program" means a series of instructions or statements that permit the functioning of a
computer system in a manner designed to provide
storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data from the
computer system, and any associated documentation
and source material that explain how to operate the
computer program.
(b) "Computer program" does not mean:
(i) the original data, including numbers, text,
voice, graphics, and images;
(ii) analysis, compilation, and other manipulated forms of the original data produced by use
of the program; or
(iii) the mathematical or statistical formulas
(excluding the underlying mathematical algorithms contained in the program) that would be
used if the manipulated forms of the original
data were to be produced manually.
(5) (a) "Contractor" means:
(i) any person who contracts with a governmental entity to provide goods or services directly to a governmental entity; or
(ii) any private, nonprofit organization that
receives funds from a governmental entity,
(b) "Contractor" does not mean a private provider.
(6) "Controlled record" means a record containing data
on individuals that is controlled as provided by Section
63-2-303.
(7) "Designation," "designate," and their derivative
forms mean indicating, based on a governmental entity's
familiarity with a record series or based on a governmental entity's review of a reasonable sample of a record
series, the primary classification that a majority of
records in a record series would be given if classified and
the classification that other records typically present in
the record series would be given if classified.
(8) "Government audit agency" means any governmental entity that conducts audits.
(9) (a) "Governmental entity" means:
(i) executive department agencies of the state,
the offices of the governor, lieutenant governor,
state auditor, attorney general, and state treasurer, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
Board of Examiners, the National Guard, the
Career Service Review Board, the State Board of
Education, the State Board of Regents, and the
State Archives;
(ii) the Office of the Legislative Auditor General, Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst,
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, the Legislature, and legislative committees,
except any political party, group, caucus, or rules
or sifting committee of the Legislature;
(iii) courts, the Judicial Council, the Office of
the Court Administrator, and similar administrative units in the judicial branch;
(iv) any state-funded institution of higher education or public education; or
(v) any political subdivision of the state, but, if
a political subdivision has adopted an ordinance
or a policy relating to information practices pursuant to Section 63-2-701, this chapter shall
apply to the political subdivision to the extent
specified in Section 63-2-701 or as specified in
any other section of this chapter that specifically
refers to political subdivisions.
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(b) "Governmental entity" also means every office,
agency, board, bureau, committee, department, advisory board, or commission of the entities listed in
Subsection (9)(a) that is funded or established by the
government to carry out the public's business.
(10) "Gross compensation" means every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an individual for
services provided including salaries, commissions, vacation pay, severance pay, bonuses, and any board, rent,
housing, lodging, payments in kind, and any similar
benefit received from the individual's employer.
(11) "Individual" means a human being.
(12) (a) "Initial contact report" means an initial written or recorded report, however titled, prepared by
peace officers engaged in public patrol or response
duties describing official actions initially taken in
response to either a public complaint about or the
discovery of an apparent violation of law, which
report may describe:
(i) the date, time, location, and nature of the
complaint, the incident, or offense;
(ii) names of victims;
(iii) the nature or general scope of the agency's
initial actions taken in response to the incident;
(iv) the general nature of any injuries or estimate of damages sustained in the incident;
(v) the name, address, and other identifying
information about any person arrested or
charged in connection with the incident; or
(vi) the identity of the public safety personnel
(except undercover personnel) or prosecuting attorney involved in responding to the initial incident.
(b) Initial contact reports do not include follow-up
or investigative reports prepared after the initial
contact report. However, if the information specified
in Subsection (a) appears in follow-up or investigative
reports, it may only be treated confidentially if it is
private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b).
(13) "Person" means any individual, nonprofit or profit
corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other
type of business organization.
(14) "Private provider" means any person who contracts with a governmental entity to provide services
directly to the public.
(15) "Private record" means a record containing data on
individuals that is private as provided by Section 63-2302.
(16) "Protected record" means a record that is classified
protected as provided by Section 63-2-304.
(17) "Public record" means a record that is not private,
controlled, or protected and that is not exempt from
disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201(3 Kb).
(18) (a) "Record" means all books, letters, documents,
papers, maps, plans, photographs, films, cards, tapes,
recordings, electronic data, or other documentary
materials regardless of physical form or characteristics:
(i) which are prepared, owned, received, or
retained by a governmental entity or political
subdivision; and
(ii) where all of the information in the original
is reproducible by photocopy or other mechanical
or electronic means.
(b) "Record" does not mean:
(i) temporary drafts or similar materials prepared for the originator's personal use or pre-
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pared by the originator for the personal use of an
individual for whom he is working;
(ii) materials that are legally owned by an
individual in his private capacity;
(iii) materials to which access is limited by the
laws of copyright or patent unless the copyright
or patent is owned by a governmental entity or
political subdivision;
(iv) proprietary software;
(v) junk mail or commercial publications received by a governmental entity or an official or
employee of a governmental entity;
(vi) books and other materials that are cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and contained in
the collections of libraries open to the public,
regardless of physical form or characteristics of
the material;
(vii) daily calendars and other personal notes
prepared by the originator for the originator's
personal use or for the personal use of an individual for whom he is working;
(viii) computer programs as defined in Subsection (4) that are developed or purchased by or for
any governmental entity for its own use; or
(ix) notes or internal memoranda prepared as
part of the deliberative process by a member of
the judiciary, an administrative law judge, a
member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, or a
member of any other body charged by law with
performing a quasi-judicial function.
(19) "Record series" means a group of records that may
be treated as a unit for purposes of designation, description, management, or disposition.
(20) "Records committee" means the State Records
Committee created in Section 63-2-501.
(21) "Records officer" means the individual appointed
by the chief administrative officer of each governmental
entity, or the political subdivision to work with state
archives in the care, maintenance, scheduling, designation, classification, disposal, and preservation of records.
(22) "Schedule," "scheduling," and their derivative
forms mean the process of specifying the length of time
each record series should be retained by a governmental
entity for administrative, legal, fiscal, or historical purposes and when each record series should be transferred
to the state archives or destroyed.
(23) "State archives" means the Division of Archives
and Records Service created in Section 63-2-901.
(24) "State archivist" means the director of the state
archives.
(25) "Summary data" means statistical records and
compilations that contain data derived from private,
controlled, or protected information but that do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information.
1994
63-2-104.

A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e s Act not applicable.
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, does
not apply to this chapter except as provided in Section
63-2-603.
1992
63-2-105. Confidentiality a g r e e m e n t s .
If a governmental entity or political subdivision receives a
request for a record that is subject to a confidentiality agreement executed before April 1, 1992, the law in effect at the
time the agreement was executed, including late judicial
interpretations of the law, shall govern access to the record,
unless all parties to the confidentiality agreement agree in
writing to be governed by the provisions of this chapter. 1992
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ACCESS TO RECORDS
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3*2-201.

Right to i n s p e c t r e c o r d s a n d r e c e i v e c o p i e s
of records.
J (1) Every person has the right to inspect a public record free
^ c h a r g e , and the right to take a copy of a public record during
formal working hours, subject to Sections 63-2-203 and 63-2204.
(2) All records are public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute.
(3) The following records are not public:
(a) records that are private, controlled, or protected
under Sections 63-2-302, 63-2-303, and 63-2-304; and
(b) records to which access is restricted p u r s u a n t to
court rule, another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation, including records for which access is
governed or restricted as a condition of participation in a
state or federal program or for receiving state or federal
funds.
(4) Only those records specified in Section 63-2-302, 63-2303, or 63-2-304 may be classified private, controlled, or
protected.
(5) (a) A governmental entity may not disclose a record
that is private, controlled, or protected to any person
exce£rr?as provided in Subsection (5)(b), Section 63-2-202,
or Section 63-2-206.
(b) A governmental entity may disclose records t h a t are
private under Subsection 63-2-302(2) or protected under
Section 63-2-304 to persons other t h a n those specified in
Section 63-2-202 or 63-2-206 if the head of a governmental
entity, or a designee, determines that there is no interest
in restricting access to the record, or that the interests
favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction
of access.
(6) (a) The disclosure of records to which access is governed
or limited pursuant to court rule, another state statute,
federal statute, or federal regulation, including records
for which access is governed or limited as a condition of
participation in a state or federal program or for receiving
state or federal funds, is governed by the specific provisions of that statute, rule, or regulation.
(b) This chapter applies to records described in Subsection (a) insofar as this chapter is not inconsistent with the
statute, rule, or regulation.
(7) A governmental entity shall provide a person with a
certified copy of a record if:
(a) the person requesting the record has a right to
inspect it;
(b) the person identifies the record with reasonable
specificity; and
(c) the person pays the lawful fees.
(8) (a) A governmental entity is not required to create a
record in. response to a request.
(b) Upon request, a governmental entity shall provide a
record in a particular format if:
(i) the governmental entity is able to do so without
unreasonably interfering with the governmental entity's duties and responsibilities; and
(ii) the requester agrees to pay the governmental
entity for its costs incurred in providing the record in
the requested format in accordance with Section
63-2-203.
(c) Nothing in this section requires a governmental
entity to fulfill a person's records request if t h e request
unreasonably duplicates prior records requests from that
person.
(9) If a person requests copies of more t h a n 50 pages of
records from a governmental entity, and, if the records are
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contained in files t h a t do not contain records t h a t are exempt
from disclosure, the governmental entity may:
(a) provide the requester with the facilities for copying
the requested records and require t h a t t h e requester
make the copies himself; or
(b) allow the requester to provide his own copying
facilities and personnel to m a k e the copies at the governmental entity's offices and waive the fees for copying the
records.
(10) (a) A governmental entity t h a t owns an intellectual
property right and that offers the intellectual property
right for sale or license may control by ordinance or policy
the duplication and distribution of the material based on
terms the governmental entity considers to be in the
public interest.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit
or impair the rights or protections granted to the governmental entity under federal copyright or patent law as a
result of its ownership of the intellectual property right.
(11) A governmental entity may not use the physical form,
electronic or otherwise, in which a record is stored to deny, or
unreasonably hinder the rights of persons to inspect and
receive copies of a record under this chapter.
1994
63-2-202.

A c c e s s to private, c o n t r o l l e d , a n d p r o t e c t e d
documents.
(1) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a
private record to:
(a) the subject of the record;
(b) the parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated
minor who is the subject of the record;
(c) the legal guardian of a legally incapacitated individual who is the subject of the record;
(d) any other individual who:
(i) has a power of attorney from the subject of the
record;
(ii) submits a notarized release from the subject of
the record or his legal representative dated no more
than 90 days before the date the request is made; or
(iii) if the record is a medical record described in
Subsection 63-2-302(1 Kb), is a health care provider,
as defined in Subsection 26-33a-102(7), if releasing
the record or information in the record is consistent
with normal professional practice and medical ethics;
or
(e) any person to whom the record m u s t be provided
pursuant to court order as provided in Subsection (7) or a
legislative subpoena as provided in Title 36, Chapter 14.
(2) (a) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a
controlled record to:
(i) a physician, psychologist, certified social worker, insurance provider or agent, or a government
public health agency upon submission of a release
from the subject of the record that is dated no more
than 90 days prior to the date the request is made
and a signed acknowledgment of the t e r m s of disclosure of controlled information as provided by Subsection (b); and
(ii) any person to whom the record m u s t be disclosed pursuant to court order as provided in Subsection (7) or a legislative subpoena as provided in Title
36, Chapter 14.
(b) A person who receives a record from a governmental
entity in accordance with Subsection (2)(a)(i) may not
disclose controlled information from t h a t record to any
person, including the subject of the record.
(3) If there is more than one subject of a private or controlled record, the portion of the record t h a t pertains to
another subject shall be segregated from the portion t h a t the
requester is entitled to inspect.

63-2-203

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(4) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a
protected record to:
(a) the person who submitted the record;
(b) any other individual who:
(i) has a power of attorney from all persons, governmental entities, or political subdivisions whose
interests were sought to be protected by the protected
classification; or
(ii) submits a notarized release from all persons,
governmental entities, or political subdivisions whose
interests were sought to be protected by the protected
classification or from their legal representatives
dated no more than 90 days prior to the date the
request is made; or
(c) any person to whom the record must be provided
pursuant to a court order as provided in Subsection (7) or
a legislative subpoena as provided in Title 36, Chapter 14.
(5) A governmental entity may disclose a private, controlled, or protected record to another governmental entity,
political subdivision, another state, the United States, or a
foreign government only as provided by Section 63-2-206.
(6) Before releasing a private, controlled, or protected
record, the governmental entity shall obtain evidence of the
requester's identity.
(7) A governmental entity shall disclose a record pursuant
to the terms of a court order signed by a judge from a court of
competent jurisdiction, provided that:
(a) the record deals with a matter in controversy over
which the court has jurisdiction;
(b) the court has considered the merits of the request
for access to the record; and
(c) the court has considered and, where appropriate,
limited the requester's use and further disclosure of the
record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of
private or controlled records, business confidentiality interests in the case of records protected under Subsections
63-2-304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the public
interest in the case of other protected records;
(d) to the extent the record is properly classified private, controlled, or protected, the interests favoring access, considering limitations thereon, outweigh the interests favoring restriction of access; and
(e) where access is restricted by a rule, statute, or
regulation referred to in Subsection 63-2-201(3Kb), the
court has authority independent of this chapter to order
disclosure.
(8) (a) A governmental entity may disclose or authorize
disclosure of private or controlled records for research
purposes if the governmental entity:
(i) determines that the research purpose cannot
reasonably be accomplished without use or disclosure
of the information to the researcher in individually
identifiable form;
(ii) determines that the proposed research is bona
fide, and that the value of the research outweighs the
infringement upon personal privacy;
(iii) requires the researcher to assure the integrity,
confidentiality, and security of the records and requires the removal or destruction of the individual
identifiers associated with the records as soon as the
purpose of the research project has been accomplished;
(iv) prohibits the researcher from disclosing the
record in individually identifiable form, except as
provided in Subsection (b), or from using the record
for purposes other than the research approved by the
governmental entity; and
(v) secures from the researcher a written statement of his understanding of and agreement to the
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conditions of this subsection and his understanding
that violation of the terms of this subsection may
subject him to criminal prosecution under Section
63-2-801.
(b) A researcher may disclose a record in individually
identifiable form if the record is disclosed for the purpose
of auditing or evaluating the research program and no
subsequent use or disclosure of the record in individually
identifiable form will be made by the auditor or evaiuator
except as provided by this section.
(c) A governmental entity may require indemnification
as a condition of permitting research under this subsection.
(9) (a) Under Subsections 63-2-201(5)(b) and 63-2-401(6) a
governmental entity may disclose records that are private
under Section 63-2-302, or protected under Section 63-2304 to persons other than those specified in this section.
(b) Under Subsection 63-2-403(ll)(b) the Records Committee may require the disclosure of records that are
private under Section 63-2-302, controlled under Section
63-2-303, or protected under Section 63-2-304 to persons
other than those specified in this section.
(c) Under Subsection 63-2-404(8) the court may require
the disclosure of records that are private under Section
63-2-302, controlled under Section 63-2-303, or protected
under Section 63-2-304 to persons other than those specified in this section.
1994
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PART 3
CLASSIFICATION
63-2-301. Records that must be disclosed.
(1) The following records are public except to the extent
they contain information expressly permitted to be treated
confidentially under the provisions of Subsections 63-2201(3)(b) and (6)(a):
(a) laws;
(b) names, gender, gross compensation, job titles, job
descriptions, business addresses, business telephone
numbers, number of hours worked per pay period, dates of
employment, and relevant education, previous employment, and similar job qualifications of the governmental
entity's former and present employees and officers excluding:
(i) undercover law enforcement personnel; and
(ii) investigative personnel if disclosure could reasonably be expected to impair the effectiveness of
investigations or endanger any individual's safety;
(c) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, and orders that are made by a governmental
entity in an administrative, adjudicative, or judicial proceedings except that if the proceedings were properly
closed to the public; the opinion and order may be withheld to the extent that they contain information that is
private, controlled, or protected;
(d) final interpretations of statutes or rules by a governmental entity unless classified as protected as provided in Subsections 63-2-304(15), (16), and (17);
(e) information contained in or compiled from a transcript, minutes, or report of the open portions of a meeting
of a governmental entity as provided by Title 52, Chapter
4, Open and Public Meetings, including the records of all
votes of each member of the governmental entity;
(f) judicial records unless a court orders the records to
be restricted under the rules of civil or criminal procedure
or unless the records are private under this chapter;
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(g) records filed with or maintained by county recorders, clerks, treasurers, surveyors, zoning commissions,
the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, the School
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, the Division of Water Rights,
or other governmental entities that give public notice of:
(i) titles or encumbrances to real property;
(ii) restrictions on the use of real property;
(iii) the capacity of persons to take or convey title
to real property; or
(iv) tax status for real and personal property;
(h) records of the Department of Commerce that evidence incorporations, mergers, name changes, and uniform commercial code filings;
(i) data on individuals that would otherwise be private
under this chapter if the individual who is the subject of
the record has given the governmental entity written
permission to make the records available to the public;
(j) documentation of the compensation that a governmental entity pays to a contractor or private provider;
(k) summary data; and
(1) voter registration records, including an individual's
voting history, except for those parts of the record that are
classified as private in Subsection 63-2-302(l)(h).
(2) The following records are normally public, but to the
extent that a record is expressly exempt from disclosure,
access may be restricted under Subsection 63-2-201(3Xb),
Section 63-2-302, 63-2-303, or 63-2-304:
(a) administrative staff manuals, instructions to staff,
and statements of policy;
(b) records documenting a contractor's or private provider's compliance with the terms of a contract with a
governmental entity;
(c) records documenting the services provided by a
contractor or a private provider to the extent the records
would be public if prepared by the governmental entity;
(d) contracts entered into by a governmental entity;
(e) any account, voucher, or contract that deals with
the receipt or expenditure of funds by a governmental
entity;
(f) records relating to government assistance or incentives publicly disclosed, contracted for, or given by a
governmental entity, encouraging a person to expand or
relocate a business in Utah, except as provided in Subsection 63-2-304(34);
(g) chronological logs and initial contact reports;
(h) correspondence by and with a governmental entity
in which the governmental entity determines or states-an
opinion upon the rights of the state, a political subdivision, the public, or any person;
(i) empirical data contained in drafts if:
(i) the empirical data is not reasonably available to
the requester elsewhere in similar form; and
(ii) the governmental entity is given a reasonable
opportunity to correct any errors or make
nonsubstantive changes before release;
(j) drafts that are circulated to anyone other than:
(i) a governmental entity;
(ii) a political subdivision;
(iii) a federal agency if the governmental entity
and the federal agency are jointly responsible for
implementation of a program or project that has been
legislatively approved;
(iv) a government-managed corporation; or
(v) a contractor or private provider;
(k) drafts that have never been finalized but were
relied upon by the governmental entity in carrying out
action or policy;
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(1) original data in a computer program if the governmental entity chooses not to disclose the program;
(m) arrest warrants after issuance, except that, for
good cause, a court may order restricted access to arrest
warrants prior to service;
(n) search warrants after execution and filing of the
return, except that a court, for good cause, may order
restricted access to search warrants prior to trial;
(o) records that would disclose information relating to
formal charges or disciplinary actions against a past or
present governmental entity employee if:
(i) the disciplinary action has been completed and
all time periods for administrative appeal have expired; and
(ii) the charges on which the disciplinary action
was based were sustained;
(p) records maintained by the Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands, the School and Institutional Trust
Lands Administration, or the Division of Oil, Gas and
Mining that evidence mineral production on government
lands;
(q) final audit reports;
(r) occupational and professional licenses;
(s) business licenses; and
(t) a notice of violation, a notice of agency action under
Section 63-46b-3, or similar records used to initiate proceedings for discipline or sanctions against persons regulated by a governmental entity, but not including records
that initiate employee discipline.
(3) The list of public records in this section is not exhaustive
and should not be used to limit access to records.
1999
63-2-302. Private records.
(1) The following records are private:
(a) records concerning an individual's eligibility for
unemployment insurance benefits, social services, welfare
benefits, or the determination of benefit levels;
(b) records containing data on individuals describing
medical history, diagnosis, condition, treatment, evaluation, or similar medical data;
(c) records of publicly funded libraries that when examined alone or with other records identify a patron;
(d) records received or generated for a Senate or House
Ethics Committee concerning any alleged violation of the
rules on legislative ethics, prior to the meeting, and after
the meeting, if the ethics committee meeting was closed to
the public;
(e) records received or generated for a Senate confirmation committee concerning character, professional competence, or physical or mental health of an individual:
(i) if prior to the meeting, the chair of the committee determines release of the records:
(A) reasonably could be expected to interfere
with the investigation undertaken by the committee; or
(B) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair proceeding or impartial
hearing;
(ii) after the meeting, if the meeting was closed to
the public;
(f) records concerning a current or former employee of,
or applicant for employment with, a governmental entity
that would disclose that individual's home address, home
telephone number, social security number, insurance coverage, marital status, or payroll deductions;
(g) that part of a record indicating a person's social
security number if provided under Section 31A-23-202,
31A-26-202, 58-1-301, 61-1-4, or 61-2-6; and
(h) that part of a voter registration record identifying a
voter's driver license or identification card number, Social

Security number, or last four digits of the Social Secxnitfci
number.
v*
(2) The following records are private if properly classified
by a governmental entity:
.- ,
(a) records concerning a current or former employee o£
or applicant for employment with a governmental entityincluding performance evaluations and personal status
information such as race, religion, or disabilities, but not
including records that are public under Subsection 63-2301(l)(b) or 63-2-301(2)(o), or private under Subsection
63-2-302(l)(b);
(b) records describing an individual's finances, except
that the following are public:
(i) records described in Subsection 63-2-301(1);
(ii) information provided to the governmental entity for the purpose of complying with a financial
assurance requirement*;6r
(iii) records that must be disclosed in accordance
with another statute;
(c) records of independent state agencies if the disclosure of those records would conflict with the fiduciary
obligations of the agency;
(d) other records containing data on individuals the
disclosure of which constitutes a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy; and
(e) records provided by the United States or by a
government entity outside the state that are given with
the requirement that the records be managed as private
records, if the providing entity states in writing that the
record would not be subject to public disclosure if retained
by it.
(3) (a) As used in this Subsection (3), "medical records"
means medical reports, records, statements, history, diagnosis, condition, treatment, and evaluation.
(b) Medical records in the possession of the University
of Utah Hospital, its clinics, doctors, or affiliated entities
are not private records or controlled records under Section
63-2-303 when the records are sought:
(i) in connection with any legal or administrative
proceeding in which the patient's physical, mental, or
emotional condition is an element of any claim or
defense; or
(ii) after a patient's death, in any legal or administrative proceeding in which any party relies upon
the condition as an element of the claim or defense.
(c) Medical records are subject to production in a legal
or administrative proceeding according to state or federal
statutes or rules of procedure and evidence as if the
medical records were in the possession of a nongovernmental medical care provider.
1999

63-2-303. Controlled records.
A record is controlled if:
(1) the record contains medical, psychiatric, or psychological data about an individual;
(2) the governmental entity reasonably believes that:
(a) releasing the information in the record to the
subject of the record would be detrimental to the
subject's mental health or to the safety of any individual; or
(b) releasing the information would constitute a
violation of normal professional practice and medical
ethics; and
(3) the governmental entity has properly classified the
record.
1992

63-2-304. Protected records.
Tn7 following records are protected if properly classified by
a governmental entity:
(1) trade secrets as defined in Section 13-24-2 if the
person submitting the trade secret has provided the
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governmental entity with the information specified in
Section 63-2-308;
(2) commercial information or nonindividual financial
information obtained from a person if:
(a) disclosure of the information could reasonably
be expected to result in unfair competitive injury to
the person submitting the information or would impair the ability of the governmental entity to obtain
necessary information in the future;
(b) the person submitting the information has a
greater interest in prohibiting access than the public
in obtaining access; and
(c) the person submitting the information has provided the governmental entity with the information
.„ specified in Section 63-2-308;
(3) commercial or financial information acquired or
prepared by a governmental entity to the extent that
disclosure would lead to financial speculations in currencies, securities, or commodities that will interfere with a
planned transaction by the governmental entity or cause
substantial financial injury to the governmental entity or
state economy;
(4) records the disclosure of which could cause commercial injury to, or confer a competitive advantage upon a
potential or actual competitor of, a commercial project
entity as defined in Subsection 11-13-3(3);
(5) test questions and answers to be used in future
license, certification, registration, employment, or academic examinations;
(6) records the disclosure of which would impair governmental procurement proceedings or give an unfair
advantage to any person proposing to enter into a contract
or agreement with a governmental entity, except that this
subsection does not restrict the right of a person to see
bids submitted to or by a governmental entity after
bidding has closed;
(7) records that would identify real property or the
appraisal or estimated value of real or personal property,
including intellectual property, under consideration for
public acquisition before any rights to the property are
acquired unless:
(a) public interest in obtaining access to the information outweighs the governmental entity's need to
acquire the property on the best terms possible;
(b) the information has already been disclosed to
persons not employed by or under a duty of confidentiality to the entity;
(c) in the case of records that would identify property, potential sellers of the described property have
already learned of the governmental entity's plans to
acquire the property; or
(d) in the case of records that would identify the
appraisal or estimated value of property, the potential sellers have already learned of the governmental
entity's estimated value of the property;
(8) records prepared in contemplation of sale, exchange, lease, rental, or other compensated transaction of
real or personal property including intellectual property,
which, if disclosed prior to completion of the transaction,
would reveal the appraisal or estimated value of the
subject property, unless:
(a) the public interest in access outweighs the
interests in restricting access, including the governmental entity's interest in maximizing the financial
benefit of the transaction; or
(b) when prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity, appraisals or estimates of the value of the
subject property have already been disclosed to per-
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sons not employed by or under a duty of confidentiality to the entity;
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or
administrative enforcement purposes or audit purposes,
or for discipline, licensing, certification, or registration
purposes, if release of the records:
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with
investigations undertaken for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or registration purposes;
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with
audits, disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings;
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a
right to a fair trial or impartial hearing;
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the
identity of a source who is not generally known
outside of government and, in the case of a record
compiled in the course of an investigation, disclose
information furnished by a source not generally
known outside of government if disclosure would
compromise the source; or
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit techniques, procedures, policies, or
orders not generally known outside of government if
disclosure would interfere with enforcement or audit
efforts;
(10) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize
the life or safety of an individual;
(11) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize
the security of governmental property, governmental programs, or governmental recordkeeping systems from
damage, theft, or other appropriation or use contrary to
law or public policy;
(12) records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the
security or safety of a correctional facility, or records
relating to incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole,
that would interfere with the control and supervision of
an offender's incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole;
(13) records that, if disclosed, would reveal recommendations made to the Board of Pardons and Parole by an
employee of or contractor for the Department of Corrections, the Board of Pardons and Parole, or the Department of Human Services that are based on the employee's
or contractor's supervision, diagnosis, or treatment of any
person within the board's jurisdiction;
(14) records and audit workpapers that identify audit,
collection, and operational procedures and methods used
by the State Tax Commission, if disclosure would interfere with audits or collections;
(15) records of a governmental audit agency relating to
an ongoing or planned audit until the final audit is
released;
(16) records prepared by or on behalf of a governmental
entity solely in anticipation of litigation that are not
available under the rules of discovery;
(17) records disclosing an attorney's work product, including the mental impressions or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a governmental entity
concerning litigation;
(18) records of communications between a governmental entity and an attorney representing, retained, or
employed by the governmental entity if the communications would be privileged as provided in Section 78-24-8;
(19) personal files of a legislator, including personal
correspondence to or from a member of the Legislature,
but not correspondence that gives notice of legislative
action or policy;
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(20) fa) records in the custody or control of the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel, that, if
disclosed, would reveal a particular legislator's contemplated legislation or contemplated course of action before the legislator has elected to support the
legislation or course of action, or made the legislation
or course of action public; and
(b) for purposes of this subsection, a "Request For
Legislation" submitted to the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel is a public document
unless a legislator submits the "Request For Legislation" with a request t h a t it be maintained as a
protected record until such time as the legislator
elects to make the legislation or course of action
public;
(21) research requests from legislators to the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel or the Office of
the Legislative Fiscal Analyst and research findings prepared in response to these requests;
(22) drafts, unless otherwise classified as public;
(23) records concerning a governmental entity's strategy about collective bargaining or pending litigation;
(24) records of investigations of loss occurrences and
analyses of loss occurrences t h a t may be covered by the
Risk Management Fund, the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, or similar divisions in other governmental entities;
(25) records, other than personnel evaluations, that
contain a personal recommendation concerning an individual if disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, or disclosure is not in
t h e public interest;
(26) records that reveal the location of historic, prehistoric, paleontological, or biological resources t h a t if known
would jeopardize the security of those resources or of
valuable historic, scientific, educational, or cultural information;
(27) records of independent state agencies if the disclosure of the records would conflict with the fiduciary
obligations of the agency;
(28) records of a public institution of higher education
regarding tenure evaluations, appointments, applications
for admissions, retention decisions, and promotions,
which could be properly discussed in a meeting closed in
accordance with Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public
Meetings, provided t h a t records of the final decisions
about tenure, appointments, retention, promotions, or
those students admitted, may not be classified as protected under this section;
(29) records of the governor's office, including budget
recommendations, legislative proposals, and policy statements, that if disclosed would reveal the governor's contemplated policies or contemplated courses of action before the governor h a s implemented or rejected those
policies or courses of action or made them public;
(30) records of the Office of the Legislative Fiscal
Analyst relating to budget analysis, revenue estimates,
and fiscal notes of proposed legislation before issuance of
the final recommendations in these areas;
(31) records provided by the United States or by a
government entity outside the s t a t e t h a t are given to the
governmental entity with a requirement t h a t they be
managed as protected records if the providing entity
certifies that the record would not be subject to public
disclosure if retained by it;
(32) transcripts, minutes, or reports of the closed portion of a meeting of a public body except as provided in
Section 52-4-7;
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(33) records t h a t would reveal the contents of settlement negotiations but not including final settlements or
empirical data to the extent that they are not otherwise
exempt from disclosure;
(34) memoranda prepared by staff and used in the
decision-making process by an administrative law judge,
a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, or a
member of any other body charged by law with performing a quasi-judicial function;
(35) records that would reveal negotiations regarding
assistance or incentives offered by or requested from a
governmental entity for the purpose of encouraging a
person to expand or locate a business in Utah, but only if
disclosure would result in actual economic harm to the
person or place the governmental entity at a competitive
disadvantage, but this section may not be used to restrict
access to a record evidencing a final contract;
(36) materials to which access must be limited for
purposes of securing or maintaining the governmental
entity's proprietary protection of intellectual property
rights including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets;
(37) the name of a donor or a prospective donor to a
governmental entity, including a public institution of
higher education, and other information concerning the
donation that could reasonably be expected to reveal the
identity of the donor, provided that:
>- ...J
(a) the donor requests anonymity in writing;
(b) any terms, conditions, restrictions, or privileges relating to the donation may not be classified
protected by the governmental entity under this
Subsection (37); and
(c) except for public institutions of higher education, the governmental unit to which the donation is
made is primarily engaged in educational, charitable,
or artistic endeavors, and has no regulatory or legislative authority over the donor, a member of his
immediate family, or any entity owned or controlled
by the donor or his immediate family;
(38) accident reports, except as provided in Sections
41-6-40, 4 M 2 a - 2 0 2 , and 73-18-13;
(39) a notification of workers' compensation insurance
coverage described in Section 34A-2-205; and
(40) the following records of a public institution of
education, which have been developed, discovered, or
received by or on behalf of faculty, staff, employees, or
students of the institution: unpublished lecture notes,
unpublished research notes and data, unpublished manuscripts, creative works in process, scholarly correspondence, and confidential information contained in research
proposals. Nothing in this Subsection (40) shall be construed to affect the ownership of a record.
2000
63-2-305. P r o c e d u r e to d e t e r m i n e classification.
(1) If more than one provision of this chapter could govern
the classification of a record, the governmental entity, shall
classify the record by considering the n a t u r e of the interests
intended to be protected and t h e specificity of the competing
provisions.
(2) Nothing in Subsection 63-2-302(2), Section 63-2-303, or
63-2-304 requires a governmental entity to classify a record as
private, controlled, or protected.
1992
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Duty to e v a l u a t e r e c o r d s a n d m a k e designat i o n s and classifications.
(1) A governmental entity shall:
(a) evaluate all record series that it uses or creates;
(b) designate those record series as provided by this
chapter; and
(c) report the designations of its record series to the
state archives.

33-2-404. Judicial review.
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial review by the district
court of the records committee's order.
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days
after the date of the records committee's order.
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the
petition for judicial review.
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee
shall be served with notice of the petition in accordance
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the
district court of a governmental entity's determination as
specified in Subsection 63-2-402 (1Kb).
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than:
<H) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request by either providing
the requested records or denying the request in whole
or in part;
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to respond to the request; or
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records
if:
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection
63-2-401(l)(b) occur; and
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to
make a determination under Section 63-2-401.
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall
contain:
(a) the petitioners name and mailing address;
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which
the appeal is taken, if the petitioner brought a prior
appeal to the records committee;
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental
entity that issued the initial determination with a copy of
that determination;
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of
relief requested; and
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is
entitled to relief.
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a
protected record, the court shall allow the claimant of business
confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the claim
of business confidentiality.
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district
court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The
review shall be in camera.
(7) The court shall:
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of
evidence presented to the records committee;
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a
jury; and
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportunity.
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of
the various interests and public policies pertinent to the
classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the
disclosure of information properly classified as private,
controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access.
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate,
limit the requester's use and further disclosure of the
record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of
private or controlled records, business confidentiality interests in the case of records protected under Subsections
63-2-304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the public
interest in the case of other protected records.
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ADDENDUM B

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
VALERIE M. WILDE (7345)
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City. Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-2607
^ - ^ t ^ C r ^ v f CW»

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRENT D. YOUNG,
Plaintiff.
-vs-

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SALT LAKE COUNTY AND AARON D.
KENNARD SALT LAKE COUNTY
SHERIFF,
Defendants.

Case No. 000903955
Judge H. Wilkinson

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
on September 19, 2000, at 8:00 a.m. on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendants* Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff was personally present and
represented by Blake A. Nakamura, Esq., the Defendants were represented by Deputy District
Attorney, Valerie M. Wilde, Esq. The Court having heard orat argument reviewing the motions,
memorandums and pleadings on file and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the

Following Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
i.

On February 23, 2000, pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. §§63-2-204 and

63-2-207 Plaintiff requested records from Defendants concerning any investigation of
Any sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department where the conduct
investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling of a firearm or inappropriate
sexual conduct, both verbal or physical. On March 14, 2000, Plaintiff received a denial of
his request signed by Sgt. Maxwell.
2.

On March 28, 2000, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§63-2-401 Plaintiff

requested a review of Sgt. Maxwell's decision. This request was sent to Sheriff Kennard.
3.

On April 20, 2000, Chief Deputy Carr responded to Plaintiffs request on

behalf of Sheriff. The response reaffirmed the classification of investigative files as
protected pursuant to Utah code Ann §§63-2-304(11) and (12) and denied Plaintiff
access. The request also denied Plaintiff access to disciplinary files that had not been
appealed pursuant to Utah Code Ann §17-30-19.
4.

On May 16,2000, Plaintiff filed for judicial review pursuant to Utah Code

Ann.§63-2-404.
5.

Plaintiff is a former member of the Salt lake County Sheriffs Department.

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment on January 14, 2000. Following Plaintiffs
Termination, he appealed to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Merit Service Commission.
Proceedings before the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission are
currently on
2

hold pending resolution of Plaintiff s request for records.
6.

Plaintiffs due process rights do not outweigh the privacy interests of third parties

that may be contained in the requested information.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs request for judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)

is takenfromthe April 20. 2000 letter denying Plaintiff access to the requested records. Using the
April 20, 2000 date, Plaintiffs request for judicial review is made within the 30 days required byUtah Code Ann. §63-2-404 (2)(b)(i) and is timely.
2.

Plaintiffs has a due process right to the requested information and Utah Code

Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e) provides the court with authority to order the disclosure of the information
notwithstanding the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19.
3.

Plaintiff has a due process right to gain access to disciplinary records and

investigative files of any sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department where the
conduct investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling of a firearm or inappropriate
sexual conduct, both verbal or physical.
4.

Plaintiffs right to the information does not outweigh the privacy interests of third

parties that may be contained in the requested information.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law the Court hereby makes
the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1/

Defendants shall disclose to the Plaintiff the disciplinary records and investigative

files of any sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department where the conduct
investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling of a firearm or inappropriate sexual
conduct, both verbal or physical.
2.

Defendants may redact the identity of the party mentioned in the records or

information that would reasonably lead to the disclosure of a party's identity.
3.

Should a controversy arise concerning what information should be redacted, the

information shall be submitted to the court for an in camera review.
4.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

granted and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
DATED this*y'

dav of November. 2QQ0.
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 19, 2000

2

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT: The matter before the Court is case of

5

Brent Young versus Salt Lake County.

6

and ready to proceed?

7

MR. NAKAMURA: We are.

8

THE COURT: The defendant?

9

MS. WILDE: We are.

The plaintiff is present

10

THE COURT: You may proceed, counsel.

11

MR. NAKAMURA: Thank you.

Your Honor, may I approach.

12

I made a courtesy copy of the relevant statutes for the Court

13

to have.

14

aged, but the same language is in that Code section just under

15

different subsections and I'll note that where we depart from

16

the current code.

17

They are, as I looked through my modern code a bit

Judge, this matter comes before the Court, and we in

18

fact filed this action kind of as a companion matter that's

19

going on before the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission, and what

20

has happened is that the defendants, county sheriff, fired,

21

terminated Mr. Young.

22

administrative hearing challenging that termination.

23

two issues before that board;

24

for the charges, and two, is the discipline posed, the

25

termination, fair and proportionate when considered against

He asserted his due process right to an
There are

one, is there factual support

1

other similar cases involving similar conduct of sworn members

2

of that department.

3

We have made the GRAMA request to be prepared at that

4

administrative hearing and to present our case. We

5

specifically asked for two areas of information, one of which

6

concerned information or any correspondence received from the

7

complaining parties in this case. The defense has responded

8

that there is none that was received by the department, and

9

therefore, there's nothing to disclose, and they've denied it

10

on that basis.

11

complaining parties that's kind of a mute point and not really

12

at issue before the Court today.

13

Because of some information from the

The second request that we made was for comparable

14

cases. We did that in order to have information to go before

15

the Merit Commission to demonstrate that the discipline imposed

16

upon Mr. Young is disproportionate to the kind they found him

17

in violation of, and we wanted to bring in these other cases to

18

show that, and we did that in reliance of the case Lucas versus

19

Murray Citv Civil Service Commission where the court looked at

20

other similar cases,

21

charge were disproportionate.

22

our GRAMA requests for comparable cases.

23

comparable case, to determine whether this
They have denied our requests,

In denying them they have categorized our requests

24

into two categories.

Our request for investigative

25

information, the conduct of sworn the member, they have

categorized as protective records. With regard to the
discipline imposed, they have categorized that as not public
records under not the GRAMA statutes, but under the Deputy
Sheriff's [inaudible] statute, 17-30-19, maintained that that
statute restricts the disclosure of any disciplinary
information that may have been imposed on these officers.
The sole issue now is the request for these
comparable cases, and I'll address them in kind.
that they are public documents.

We maintain

They have maintained, number

one, that they're protected and they have done so concerning
the conduct under 63-2-304. Now in the copies I gave you under
that particular section it's subsection 8 instead of subsection
9, 9.

What it basically says there that protected records are

records that are properly classified as protected which
reasonably would interfere with a disciplinary or investigative
preceeding.

If those records reasonably interfere with an

investigative or disciplinary proceeding they're protective
records.

We maintain they would not reasonably interfere with

any investigative or disciplinary proceedings.

Why?

Because

the records we're asking for have to be cases that have been
adjudicated, where the investigation is complete, where the
disciplinary sanctions have been imposed and have been reviewed
and therefore adjudicated as well.

If they're completed, they

cannot be expected to reasonably interfere with the
investigative or disciplinary proceedings, and indeed, that's

the only information that will be of use to our case. Why?
Because we couldn't rely upon incomplete investigations or
pending investigations, or disciplinary sanctions that are
still pending or being reviewed.

They're not final yet. We're

asking for the final results of their investigations and the
final discipline.

They are not protective records. Why?

Because again, they don't, they would not reasonable interfere
with the investigative or disciplinary proceeding.
With regard to the disciplinary sanctions, and their
reliance on the Merit Commission Statute 17-30-19, they're
maintaining that it's, we can't disclose that to you because
that statute restricts us from disclosing it.
number 1, it doesn't even apply.

Our position is

It doesn't apply because

that, that statute applies to the Merit Commission, and our
requests from the Merit Commission of this information and
under that statute they can assert that they could not release
that information.
But more importantly, as that statute specifies, the
only concerns to motion, reduction in pay, suspension or
discharge of a merit employee.
discipline.

It doesn't concern minor

Indeed, cases involving minor discipline are going

to be most probative to Mr. Young's case.

Why?

Because if

minor discipline was imposed in a case that had similar facts
to Mr. Young's, then his termination is a disproportionate
discipline when compared against these comparable cases,

because they only resulted in minor discipline.

So even if it

does apply, it doesn't cover all the information we're
requesting.

It would only cover those specific instances,

suspension, demotion, termination, or reduction in pay.

Those

are the only kinds of disciplinary proceedings it would affect.
When we go back then, they're not protected records
because they're not properly classified.

Secondly, the Merit

Commission statute doesn't apply and if it does apply it
doesn't apply to all of the information we've requested.
But if that doesn't meet - and therefore, under the
statute it's public information.

If it's not restricted,

according to the statute, it is therefore public, and that's
under 63-2-201 and we're entitled to that information.
The defendants argue in response that no, the Merit
Commission Statutes do not provide the court with any authority
to release this information.

They maintain that in summary

that because there is no authority within, because there's no
authority within GRAMA to release these records, they're
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

They cite, verbatim,

in fact 63-2-202(7)(e) specifically states that it shall not be
used for that authority.
But when we look at that statute and we look
specifically to that subsection, that is not the case.

What it

states is, sub (e) states verbatim, 63-2-202(7)(e), that's what
they're citing, this is what it states: "Where access

is

restricted by rule, statute, or regulation referred to in
Subsection 63-2-201 (3) (b) the court has authority independent
of this chapter to order disclosure."

So indeed there is

authority within the GRAMA statutes to order disclosure and
when we look at subsection 7, not just subsection e, in its
totality, it's clear that it provides that GRAMA section
provide that clear authority as well because it states
subsection 7.

A governmental entity shall disclose a record

pursuant to the terms of a court order signed by a judge from a
court of competent jurisdiction provided that, and a court has
to go through a statutory analysis.

It's a balancing test

weighing the reasons for access against the reasons restricting
access.

Clearly their argument that there is no authority from

GRAMA for the Court to order disclosure of restrictive records
is erroneous. The statute specifically provide that authority.
They then maintain, Well, court, if you have the authority to
order disclosure, you cannot consider the reasons for that
information.

Specifically, you can't consider the plaintiff's

due process interest in getting that information.

Your

analysis is limited to statutory analysis.
Your Honor, I am unaware of any rule of law, whether
it be case or statute, that says a statute overrides the
constitutional principle and if Ms. Wilde has the court, rule
of law to that effect I'd like to see it.
that in here.

But she doesn't cite

I'm aware of a whole string of cases that say

just the opposite.

The statute conflicts with the

constitutional right, 'statutes invalid, not the right.
Furthermore, when you look at subsection (e) of the
statute that I was just speaking of, or subsection (7),
specifically sub (b), when you go down the analysis of the
court has to engage in to order the disclosure it states (b)
the court has considered the merits of the request for access
to the records.

Clearly the court can consider Mr. Young's due

process interest in obtaining this information.
The defense go on to say, Well, wait a second, okay,
that may be the case, but we classify these documents as
protective for a reason.

The reason is to protect the privacy

interests of the individuals involved in these records.

They,

they cite a string of speculative privacy interest that may be
compromised if this, if this information is ordered to be
disclosed.
Judge, the information that we need has nothing to do
with the personal identities of the individual officers or
parties involved in those investigations.

All we need is

records concerning a member of the department, a sworn officer,
the conduct that gave rise to the investigation and the result
of that investigation, and the discipline imposed.

We need no

identifying information, because the identification or
identifying information doesn't go at all, it's not relevant at
all to the inquiry that we need this information for and that

1

is, is it comparable to Mr. Young's case.

2

underlying facts, for what's relevant.

3

asking for.

4

privacy interest in this information.

5

that information, and therefore, the reasons restricting access

6

really are not relevant, because we're not asking for that

7

identifying information.

8
9

The facts, the

That's what we're

So yes, indeed, there may be a whole box load of
We don't need any of

Lastly, the Court - the defendants' argue that this
Court is the wrong forum to be hearing this matter.

This

10

matter should be rightfully be heard before the Merit

11

Commission.

12

has not allowed the Merit Commission to rule on this matter,

13

and further they say in their brief that to date the Merit

14

Commission hasn't found it necessary to order the disclosure.

15

The clear import from those representations, Your Honor, within

16

the argument, is that if the Merit Commission hasn't ordered

17

the disclosure, why should this court order the disclosure of

18

this information.

They go on to say that the plaintiff, Mr. Young,

19

Your Honor, I included in my Reply Brief in Exhibit

20

A, a letter from the Merit Commission directly refuting those

21

representations.

22

defendants have not timely provided the information on

23

comparable cases, thereby precluding the commission from having

24

sufficient amount of time to review these records.

25

that the defendants have failed to provide the commission with

The letter states, number 1 that the

Number 2,

8

all the information that they agreed to provide.

That last

argument is patently misleading, Your Honor, and intentionally
so.
Ms. Wilde was in those proceedings on Monday the
11th, day before these Briefs were due, I called her.

I

advised her of that inaccuracy, afforded her an opportunity to
correct that record, that, that representation, read the letter
that I would attach as an exhibit directly refuting that.
refused to do that.

She says no, that's true.

She

Well, the

letter speaks for itself, Your Honor, likewise her
representations.

I'd ask that whole argument be stricken

because it is absolutely misleading and not true.

Look at the

attached exhibits from the Merit Commission.
Judge, in the end this is what we have.
has a right to this administrative hearing.

Mr. Young

He has a right in

order to present, to have a fair hearing to present his case.
Under the case of Lucas versus Murray City Civil Service
Commission they clearly look, I've got a copy of the case for
the Court to review, if you'd like.

They, the Supreme Court

clearly looks at the comparable cases to determine whether the
discipline imposed in the case at hand was fair and
consistently imposed.

Mr. Young needs this information to

demonstrate that the discipline he received was not fair and
proportionate to the discipline when compared against similar
cases.

1

They have cited privacy interest in restricting this

2

information.

3

information, the private information, the individual, the

4

identifying information about the individuals involved.

5

only looking for the conduct and the discipline imposed.

6

That's it.

7

information.

8

reason why we need it.

9

But, Your Honor, we're not looking for that

We're

Any private information can be redacted from this
It's not necessary.

It's not relevant to the

So on balance, when you look at Subsection (7) of

10

that statute, you have a constitutional right to have this

11

information.

12

that that's evidence relevant in this inquiry.

13

consider the reason restricting access, all they have is

14

privacy interest.

15

and therefore, on balance, clearly the need for this

16

information outweighs the need to in, the reason for

17

restricting access.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

You have a Supreme Court case that recognizes
When you look,

But all that information can be redacted,

THE COURT: Do you have any reason to believe that
he's not, he has not been treated fairly?
MR. NAKAMURA: Well we know, we have not gone through
the Merit Commission.

They're, they're waiting, so, today.

THE COURT: I said do you have any reason to believe
he has not been treated fairly?
MR. NAKAMURA: Yes, if you look at, if you look at our
opening brief and I think it's Exhibit A, the reasons for his
10

1

termination was based -

2

THE COURT: I know the reason for his termination.

3

MR. NAKAMURA: Well, well, but, I think this is, this

4

is what I'm going to, why I'm going to say I have reason to

5

believe it.

6

judgment, poor word usage.

7

for.

8

said that's not even at issue, in that letter.

9

him for poor judgment.

10

They terminated him based upon a finding of poor
That's what they've terminated him

They didn't terminate for any ill intent.

In fact, they
They terminated

Now I know of at least one case where an officer was

11

involved in sem, in equally inappropriate sexual behavior and

12

was not terminated.

13

conduct similar to that of Mr. Young's, or, and even in fact

14

more egregious to that of Mr. Young's where the discipline was

15

not termination but was a letter of reprimand.

16

is.

17

got is poor judgment here and we're gonna discipline for that,

18

and instead of giving him minor discipline for the poor

19

judgment, they elevate it to major discipline, and so on the

20

face of that there is a reason to believe that because the

21

punishment isn't proportionate on the face to the conduct they

22

find him in violation of.

I'm beginning to hear of other cases where

So, yes, there

I mean essentially what they're saying is, Hey, all we've

23

THE COURT: Okay, counsel.

24

MS. WILDE: Your Honor, if I may for just a brief

25

moment, I want to go over the facts a little bit more.

What we
11

1

have initially, and both parties agree what the initial request

2

for records was, and that was a request for investigative

3

files.

4

correspondence is a moot issue, because there is none.

5

replied to that we broke it down into two types of

6

investigative files, one, disciplinary records and the other

7

internal affairs investigative files.

8

investigative files contained within the sheriff's office.

9

That record's request was denied.

I think Mr, Nakamura has admitted the request for
When we

Those are the two

Mr. Nakamura appealed that

10

record's request to the Chief Administrative Officer, which is

11

Sheriff Kennard.

12

respond within the five days.

13

that failure to respond within five days is deemed a denial,

14

and then the statute specifically says you have 35 days from

15

the record's request and no response to take your appeal. Mr.

16

Nakamura did not take his appeal in that 35 days.

17

first motion for summary judgment on the issue of jurisdiction

18

of this court to even entertain this record's request, meaning

19

that Mr. Nakamura was untimely.

20

Sheriff Kennard, under the statute, did not
The statute specifically says

That's our

The sheriff's office did respond on April 20th,

21

beyond the statutory period.

Now Mr. Nakamura in his reply

22

brief has argued, Well, then you can take your appeal from that

23

late response.

24

to do that, Your Honor, you don't give effect to the entire

The response that was 16 days late.

In order

25 I statutory provision that talks about how you take an appeal to
12

the district court.

There is an ability for a department that

can't respond timely to say I'm not going to respond because of
extraordinary circumstances and you have a right to an appeal
from that statement by the department as well.
If you, if you allow late appeals from any response
from the department, no matter when it is given, you in effect
don't give any credence to the statute which gives specific
time limits and requires that your appeal be taken within 35
days.

One section says your appeal must be taken within 35

days, and the other section that we specifically cited in our
brief which is 63-2-401(5)(b) says if a Chief Administrative
Officer fails to make a determination within a time specified
the failure shall be considered the equivalent of an order
denying the appeal.

So that gives 35 days from his request

that he should have taken his appeal.
THE COURT: Why did they respond?

Why did Sheriff's

Department respond?
MS. WILDE: We responded because there were records in
the initial denial that were public that he was not given, and
for instance, any deputy that appeals a disciplinary matter to
the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission lose, loses the privacy
protections provided under 17-30-19. We provided him I believe
two files on deputies that appealed their discipline that
either related to firearms or sexual activity.
THE COURT:

And you don't think that had any, any
13

1

effect of any renewal of any sort?

2

MS. WILDE:

I don't, Your Honor.

I don't think we

3

can, I don't think we can enlarge the jurisdiction by doing

4

that.

5

THE COURT: Let's see you, you told me why you

6

responded and my question is probably not very clear.

7

question should have been if he was out of court why did you

8

review that and give an opportunity to come back to court.

9

other words, we had passed 35 days, why'd you renew it?

10

My

In

Not

what did you give him, but -

11

MS. WILDE: Right.

12

THE COURT: - why'd you do it?

13

MS. WILDE: Because that's when they responded. I

14

don't think we have a purpose.

15

denied initially, from the initial request, that he should have

16

been given.

17

there's penalties for our failure to comply and that may have

18

been one of the reasons.

19

sheriff's office responded late.

20

than 16 days after that five day period.

21

after his appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer they sent

22

him a letter saying, which is Exhibit 1 in our brief, it's also

23

attached to Mr. Nakamura's.

24

Those were records that were

The statute requires us to comply with the act or

I don't actually know why the
But they did respond more
So within 21 days

Regarding the actual records that he's requesting,

25 I first I want to make note that any disciplinary record that has
14

been appealed he's received copies of them.

We have 17-30-19

which is a provision in the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Act that
says disciplinary records that are not appealed are
confidential.

Those records Mr. Nakamura's arguing to the

court that, Well though, it's those records that remain with
the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission.

Well, the Deputy

Sheriff's Merit Commission is the administrative body over the
Sheriff's Department.

Any discipline, whether it's initiating

from the sheriff's office, any major discipline, demotion,
suspension, termination, must be sent to the Deputy Sheriff's
Merit Commission.

So his argument, Well I'm not requesting it

from them, I'm requesting it from the initiating body, it's the
same record.
records.

We have no greater right to release those

Those are protected.

It would give no effect to 17-

30-19 to say the sheriff's office could release the records,
but the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission could not. All
charges of major discipline are filed with that body, okay, by,
by statute.
GRAMA specifically says that if there is a
controlling statute, that statute prevails, and this Court
needs some kind of independent authority to release the
records.

I want to go back over the specific section that Mr.

Nakamura read, because he only read part of that section to the
Court, and that's the section that specifically deals with this
Court's need to have independent authority to release the
15

1

records when there's a statute that controls.

2

starts out by saying a gover-

That statute

3

THE COURT: Which one are you reading from?

4

MS. WILDE: I am reading from 63-2-3-203(7), and I'm

5

going to start with subparagraph 7 because there's an important

6

part there, 63-2-203 subparagraph 7.

7

MR. NAKAMURA: Isn't it 202, not 203?

8

THE COURT: Now is that -

9

MS. WILDE: Yeah, I'm sorry, Your Honor, 202.

10

THE COURT: 202, Subparagraph 7?

11

MS. WILDE: Right.

12

THE COURT: [inaudible].

13

MS. WILDE: Okay, a governmental entity shall disclose

14

a record pursuant to the terms of the court order signed by a

15

judge from a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that,

16

and that's the part that Mr. Nakamura did not read, we go to

17

subsection (e) where access is restricted by a rule, statute,

18

regulation referred to in Subsection 63-201, and that's, we're

19

referring to 17-30-19 in this instance.

20

authority independent of this chapter to order disclosure.

21

That statute prohibits the release of those major disciplinary

22

records.

23

We do not believe that it does.

24

independent basis to give that release for the disciplinary

25

records.

The court has

Mr. Nakamura argued that this section allows release.
There has to be some

So that would be our position on those.
16

1 J

Any disciplinary record that has been appealed, that

2

has already been provided.

3

unappealed disciplinary records, and I believe, Your Honor,

4

that it's my Exhibit 5 will contain 17-30-19 for the Court.

5
6

So we're only dealing with

MR. NAKAMURA: It's also attached to the last statute
that I attached to your packet, Your Honor.

7

MS. WILDE: And that, and what's important to note

8

about that particular section, it has just been recently

9

amended by the legislature, and they have not chosen to

10

characterize the records of an officer differently.

11

to this last legislative session this, there had been no

12

amendment since the %60fs to this statute, and then GRAMA came

13

along.

14

assume, with some consideration of GRAMA in mind when they

15

amended 17-30-19, and they made no change to the fact that

16

these records, unappealed disciplinary records, remain private.

17

That's the basis for us denying the disciplinary files.

18

So prior

It has now subsequently been amended with, we can

The basis for denying internal affairs files is

19

different.

There is no statute that covers internal affairs

20

files.

21

time to, to classify records.

22

records when you create the record, or it allows you to

23

classify a record when you get a request.

24

case, we classified the records when the request was made.

25

That classification was protected, and in particular we cited

We have a request.

GRAMA allows you at two points in
It allows you to classify

In this particular

17

1

63-2-304(9) as our basis for protecting the records.

2

records were created or maintained for civil, criminal,

3

criminal, or administrative enforcement purposes or for

4

discipline.

5

That's why they were created.

6

activity and it either is administrative, criminal or civil,

7

civil.

8
9

That the

That's the basis of our internal affairs files.
We're investigating some type of

The reason why we believe that releasing those
records interferes with investigations is because the nature of

10

the investigations within the sheriff's office.

11

officers are compelled to give statements to internal affairs

12

when they're giving an investigation.

It's part of their

13

employment with the sheriff's office.

They are given their

14

garity rights often and compelled to give testimony before that

15

body.

16

against another officer that we do not release that information

17

unnecessarily;

18

testimony of those other officers when we may be using it

19

against another officer.

20

back out in the fields with one another and they need to

21

maintain that, that level of trust with one another, and so

22

there are definite purposes, even long after the investigation

23

is concluded, that we don't release other officer's statements

24

to one another.

25

First off,

It is important if one officer is compelled to testify

that we use to the minimal extent possible the

Those officers oftentimes are working

There's also good reasons why we may not release a
18

1

confidential informants name even after an investigation has

2

been concluded.

3

affairs file that we do not want to make public even after the

4

investigation is over with, and then in addition to those types

5

of records, we even get confidential information.

6

turn over documents, statements that they might not otherwise

7

do during these types of investigation, and we believe those

8

third parties have a protected fourth amendment interest in

9

those type of records.

10

So there's definite records within an internal

People will

We believe that the, for the internal affairs file

11

this Court has the ability under GRAMA to weigh and balance Mr.

12

Young's need for the record versus these third party's privacy

13

interest, and the reasons that we classified the records as

14

protected.

15

the authority under the statute.

16

I believe this Court has the ability to do that and

What's important to note is that we do have parties

17

alleging potentially fourth amendment interest.

We have

18

unrepresented third parties here that those files belong to.

19

They are not connected or referenced in any way to Mr.

20

Nakamura's discipline - to Mr. Young's discipline, excuse me.

21

What is important to note is that the case of Lucas

22

v. Murray City has been cited for authority to turn over the

23

files.

24

discipline is unfair or disproportionate.

25

our brief, we, and in fact Exhibit 10 will set the standards

We need these files, these records, to prove that the
For the Court, in

19

1

that the sheriff's office uses in disciplinary actions.

It is

2

the sheriff's burden to demonstrate that it has complied with

3

those requirements.

4

meet that burden.

5

the burden that the discipline is consistent, fair, timely,

6

appropriate, and progressive and it defines that.

7

standards are different than Murray City's standards and that's

8

the argument why we believe that the Deputy Sheriff Merit

9

Commission should be the body that's determining what records

It is not Mr. Young's responsibility to
It will be the sheriff's obligation to meet

Those

10

are necessary to meet these standards, and we believe that any

11

argument in asserting that somehow he's losing a due process

12

right is certainly at this point not ripe for consideration.

13

We have not been to a hearing before the Deputy Sheriff's Merit

14

Commission.

15

those records for some time now.

16

records released.

17

files, but other disciplinary matters so that they could review

18

them in camera.

19

records that we have not provided were minor disciplinary

20

records.

21

Commission of which Mr. Nakamura received a copy, explaining

22

that 17-30-19 we believed prohibited us from releasing that,

23

even to the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission because they were

24

unappealed disciplinary matters.

25

The Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission has had
They have not ordered those

They have asked for, not internal affairs

Those records have been provided.

The only

That went with a letter to the Deputy Sheriff's Merit

Apart from what Mr. Nakamura attached to his reply
20

1

brief, previously he attached the last letter of the Deputy

2

Sheriff's Merit Commission which is his Exhibit B.

3

B specifically notes that the Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission

4

is extending the hearing until the GRAMA issues are resolved.

5

That's the last letter that, that either party has received

6

from the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission.

7

their proceedings are not moving forward until the GRAMA issues

8

are resolved.

9

His Exhibit

It indicates that

It does not indicate that they have in their own mind

10

resolved the issue of their in camera review in, in what

11

records should or should not be released.

12

order or a decision of any type on that issue from that body.

13

It is our position that they are best suited to determine what

14

records should be released.

15

is different from Mr. Nakamura's original records request, that

16

all he is seeking at this point in time is the conduct of the

17

party's and the outcome as a result of that conduct, is pretty

18

much the camel's nose within the tent.

19

documents are released, they will be released in isolation.

20

other words, you'll be able to see some type of dry fact,

21

misuse of a firearm in some way, and the resulting discipline.

22

But you won't have any facts to know why that discipline was

23

arrived at, and the more facts you begin to release, the more

24

of an invasion of privacy that you begin to pursue into those

25

records.

We do not have an

The argument that, which I think

The minute those
In
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1

And so we have some definite concerns that we have.

2

parties that either have a statutory protective right to those

3

documents, and certainly potential fourth amendment

4

constitutional rights to privacy and the information that's

5

contained in the internal affairs files.

6

THE COURT: What are you saying?

Are you saying that

7

if you release the material which Mr. Nakamura asked for that

8

it would not be sufficient information, as far as your position

9

is concerned, as to why that person was terminated?

10

MS. WILDE: Right.

If, if in fact, which I believe is

11

different than his initial request, his argument to the Court

12

was all he's seeking is the nature of the conduct and the

13

outcome, you know, how they were disciplined.

14
15
16

THE COURT: That's what I understand he's asking for
now.
MS. WILDE: Right, and if you'd like me to give the

17

court examples I'm more than willing to do so.

18

if you allege that the sexual activity was an officer having

19

sex with another female or, or, while married.

20

situations may result in discipline of the officer.

21

instance, let's say the officer had been currently married to a

22

spouse, living with a spouse and having an adulterous affair.

23

We regulate the off-duty conduct of officers and that may very

24

well result in discipline.

25 J

For instance,

One of those
For

Let's say we have another situation where an officer
22

1

is currently married on the books, but has not resided or lived

2

with his spouse in years and is consummating a relationship

3

with somebody else and living together with them.

4

alleged, adulterous affair, but may result in different forms

5

of discipline based upon the nature of that officer's living

6

condition, and until you go into those facts, you'll never know

7

why the particular discipline was reached.

8
9
10

THE COURT:

Same conduct

Would you provide in your release of the

one case the officer was living with his wife, the second case
he was not?

11

Are you saying that came too close to privacy?

MS. WILDE:

I certainly think, think that that is

12

Your Honor, because, you know, we're, we're beginning to

13

discuss all of the facts of the case at that point in time.

14

THE COURT:

What you're saying is that is misleading

15

to the administrative hearing, or the body that's hearing the

16

matter.

17

MS. WILDE:

Right, and I believe that that's an

18

appropriate issue for that administ- I don't believe that those

19

issues are ripe yet.

20

been denied due process.

21

the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission will find a way to

22

provide Mr. Young with the due process that he is entitled to.

23

Under the policies of the Sheriff's office he will get those

24

records that he's entitled to and they will move forward as

25

they always do with a hearing.

A hearing has not happened.

He has not

I have every reason to believe that

The standards that they have
23

1

are different than the standards that they had in the Lucas

2

case that's cited.

3

discipline, similar conduct reach similar discipline.

4

discipline must be fair for the actual act and so that's the

5

reason why each particular case must be weighed and balanced

6

upon its own merit.

We utilize a byf we don't have to have
Our

7

THE COURT: Now -

8

MS. WILDE: With that, with that, Your Honor, I would

9

submit.

10

THE COURT: And why do you say that you're confident

11

that, that he will receive due process if the hearing goes

12

forth?

13

MS. WILDE: Because I believe the Deputy Sheriff's

14

Merit Commission certainly has the authority to order, they

15

have not asked for us to provide it in camera investigative

16

files, meaning the IA files.

17

in camera the conduct and the outcome of disciplinary records -

They have asked for us to provide

18

THE COURT: [inaudible]

19

MS. WILDE:

20

THE COURT: Now what are you saying now?

21

- in a matrix.
You say

they've asked you to provide what?

22

MS. WILDE: In camera -

23

THE COURT: Who's asking what?

24

MS. WILDE: The Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission has

25

asked for an in camera review of the discipline imposed on
24]

officers.

So that would be a statement of the conduct and then

a statement of the outcome.

Pretty much what Mr. Nakamura has

just requested the Court for.
THE COURT: And you say an in camera review.

When you

say in camera is that by MS. WILDE: The deputy sheriff, right.

Those

documents have been placed up before the Deputy Sheriff's Merit
Commission with the exception of minor discipline, and the
reason why we have not placed minor discipline before that body
is because they don't naturally receive minor discipline. They
do receive copies of all major discipline.
THE COURT:

So what you're saying is that they will

have all the material information which Mr. Nakamura is asking
for, they will utilize that, but Mr. Nakamura will not have
access to it.
MS. WILDE: I don't know what they will do with it.
They could very well look at what they have before them and
decide that Mr. Nakamura needs that information in order to
give him THE COURT:

[over talking]

MS. WILDE:

- Mr. Young a due process hearing.

THE COURT:

Go ahead, finish.

MS. WILDE:

They do not have before them internal

affairs files, nor have they asked for them.

In other words,

they have not said please provide us with internal affairs
25

files.

They've only asked for disciplinary records.
THE COURT: And when does this take place, not by

time, but I'll, I'll/ before the Merit Commission, which he has
not gone before, is that what you're saying?
MS. WILDE: Right.

We've had two pre-hearing

conferences and the latest correspondence which is Exhibit B to
Mr. Nakamura's Motion for Summary Judgment, indicates that
they're delaying the actual hearing date until this GRAMA
request before your court has been determined.
THE COURT: And if I deny his request, this hearing
goes forth?
MS. WILDE: Right.
THE COURT: Does he then have the right, by he, the
defendant then have, or the plaintiff, Mr. Nakamura, then have
the right to come back before this Court to renew their request
for documents?
MS. WILDE: Not in that sense.

If he goes before the

Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission and is denied due process, or
believes that he's been denied due process, he can appeal that
to this district court.
THE COURT: You say that his appeal here today is
premature?
MS. WILDE: I am, Your Honor.

If that's the reason

for it is the due process issue, that issue itself is
premature.

He has not even had that hearing yet, and so we
26

don't know whether he will or will not be denied due process.
THE COURT: And statute-wise, where is this covered,
or is this covered by statute?
MS. WILDE:

It, it is covered by statute in the

Deputy Sheriff's Merit Act, which is 17-30-1, et seq.

That

tells you the procedural requirements of that hearing body.
THE COURT:

And you cite a statute on your last page

of your Brief, next to last page you refer to 63-2-404. Begs
the court to consider to weigh the various interest in public
policy pursuant, pertinent to the classification disclosure,
disclosure, what authority do I have under that section?
MS. WILDE: I believe you can balance Mr. Young's
request for the records, and he's saying I want the records for
an administrative hearing.

I do not believe that you can, can,

can consider his due process rights, because those are not yet
ripe.

I believe that you can say, Okay, here's a person asking

for government records.

He wants them for an administrative

hearing, he's told us that, and you must weigh and balance that
against the privacy interest of these other third parties who
are not even here before this Court and decide who, who
prevails.
THE COURT: Okay, and I agree with what you say there.
But do I make that decision now or do I make that decision
after he has his hearing before the Merit Commission?
MS. WILDE: I, I believe that you, you can make that
27

decision now on internal affairs files, but I believe that
17-30-19 is controlling on disciplinary records, and that you
don't have authority unless there's some statute that I'm
unaware of at this time that would you give you authority to
release that.
.THE COURT:

And is that prior to the administrative

hearing or, or, MS. WILDE:

Even -

THE COURT:

- [over talking] authority any time?

MS. WILDE: Any time.

I don't even believe that the

Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission can release disciplinary
files.
What I think is important to note, Mr. Nakamura stood
up here and said well I'm hearing rumors about all this kind of
discipline and that there's even more egregious cases where
they, the sheriff has done a lot less discipline.

There is

nothing that prevents him from calling those individuals before
the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission and putting them under
oath and having them testify.

But what he wants is to go on a

fishing expedition and pull out all these third party's records
and have their, their privacy violated by laying their
discipline before them and pick and choose which one of those
individuals he'd like to put up on the stand.
If he is aware of individuals, and certainly all
disciplinary matters within the sheriff's office go before a
28

1

captain's board, he can place the captain's on the stand and

2

have them testify about whether or not they're fair, or

3

consistent and appropriate in their discipline, whether they're

4

timely,

5

THE COURT: And you say he could call them to testify.

6

Do you think you, you would disclose this material, it would be

7

sufficient that he could identify who the officers were.

8
9

MS. WILDE:
certainly.

I think some times you could, most

Sometimes not.

I mean, you know, if an officer is

10

accused of drawing his fire, firearm inappropriately.

I mean

11

there's been so many cases of that he couldn't figure out who

12

that was, but certainly there's, there's rumors within any

13

department and if the conduct is egregious enough they

14

probably, you could find somebody who knew who committed the

15

act.

Thank you.

16

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

17

MR. NAKAMURA: Judge, the defendants are trying to

18

boot strap what's happening between the Merit Commission to

19

proceedings here today.

20

a GRAMA appeal or judicial review of a GRAMA request.

21

it have relationships to what's happening before the Merit

22

Commission?

23

we're asking for this information.

24
25

The statutes are very clear.

Yes, in one narrow regard.

This is
Now does

That's the reason why

THE COURT: Why shouldn't you go and have your hearing
before the Merit and 29

1

MR. NAKAMURA: Okay.

2

THE COURT: - then come back here if you are

3

unsuccessful?

4

MR. NAKAMURA:

It doesn't, the GRAMA statutes don't

5

provide that.

6

saying these are separate proceedings.

7

you look at the statute, specifically the GRAMA statutes

8

[inaudible] judicial review, and I had not included that in, in

9

the packet that I provided you.

10
11

That's the whole thing, and then that's why I'm

THE COURT:

When you look at, when

But it's under 63-2-404.

Okay, that's the one that's she's

referred to and that I just asked her about. Okay.

12

MR. NAKAMURA:

It does, it doesn't allow this court

13

to essentially police the proceedings before the Merit

14

Commission to determine whether Mr. Young has been afforded a

15

fair hearing or not.

16

for certain records pursuant to GRAMA.

17

We appeal it to the governmental, the head of the agency.

18

was denied there.

19

review of that denial, period.

20

this Court to kind of retain jurisdiction over this matter, to

21

police the -

22
23
24
25

It's very specific.

We have, we asked

They initially deny it.
It

Under this statute we can then ask for a
That's it.

It does not allow

THE COURT: Oh, I don't say retains jurisdiction, I
didn't MR. NAKAMURA: Okay, well then, if that's not the
case, then what would have to be contemplated is that we would
30 I

1

then have to make another request.

2

THE COURT: Yeah.

3

MR. NAKAMURA: And go through the whole slow process.

4

Any -

5

THE COURT: Isn't that the administrative process?

6

MR. NAKAMURA: It is not, and I'll explain it this,

7

this way, Your Honor.

We have to go through, as you know

8

certain administrative steps to challenge the termination.

9

have to exhaust those steps before we can go into the courts of

We

10

the State to have that role reviewed.

11

therefore your, Mr. Young's assertion that he has a due process

12

right to this information is premature and should not be before

13

the Court.

It, it's so incredible and its proportions doesn't

14

make sense.

Because this is, this is the translation, this is

15

the analogy, you got a defendant going to trial.

16

be tried in court of law, a recognized, legitimate court of

17

law, presumptively therefore his rights would be protected.

18

Prosecution, you don't have to give him anything in advance of

19

that hearing.

20

the evidence is, and therefore you have due process

21

protections.

22

Why?

Her comment that

He's going to

Because once you get there you'll see what

That's not the way that it's done, Your Honor.

23

That's not the way these matters are litigated or proceed.

24

Information is disclosed up front, and it's the same in civil

25 J cases.

There's a process of discovery.

That's all I'm doing
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1

here.

But because these are governmental records I've got to

2

go through a GRAMA request to get them.

3

fundamentally all we're dealing with here, and to somehow say

4

that well, geez, your, your, your assertion on the due process

5

interest in this, in these records are premature because you

6

haven't gone through the hearing yet is kind of like telling a

7

defendant, whether it be civil or criminal, get through your

8

trial without any information and then we'll review everything.

9

That's a little too late.

And that, that's

We're entitled to this information

10

up front, and it's limited -

11

THE COURT: No, no.

Mr. Nakamura, I understand what

12

you're saying, and, and, but I understood from counsel, Ms.

13

Wilde, that you have the right to this hearing before the Merit

14

Commission.

15

to this court to file the appeal, or the request which you have

16

filed now for these records and upon these records being

17

disclosed you could then go before their commission.

18
19
20

Then if they rule against you, you could then come

MR. NAKAMURA:

And here's the problem with that,

Judge.
THE COURT:

And, one last statement, and if that's

21

the case, don't you have to exhaust your administrative remedy,

22

to go before that Merit Commission on the first instance?

23
24

MR. NAKAMURA:

Sure, and I understand that.

First of

all, the statute specifically, 63-2-404 and like statutes

25 J considering the review upon request does not apply to the Merit
32

1

Commission.

So they don't have the authority to order

2

disclosure of this within the GRAMA statute.

3

what she's saying is that well what a sec.

4

the hearing with the Merit Commission, and then make a request,

5

if you, if you feel you were denied due process because you

6

were denied certain information.

7

before this Court and ask for a release of those records, from

8

which you will then have, and then you can use for further

9

proceedings.

Now I understand

You can go through

You could then come back

10

If the Court will recall her first argument that she

11

made when she first stood up here, our request was not timely.

12

How in the world does she think that our request would be

13

timely not within 35 days, not 60 days, but some time after the

14

Merit Commission proceedings have concluded that we can then

15

make the request.

If, now that clearly would be untimely.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. NAKAMURA:

18

THE COURT:

19

Does the statute provide anything for I'm not aware of any.

A time limit or anything after the Meri.t

Commission?

20

MR. NAKAMURA: It does not, a nd see that's what I'm

21

saying, that's why I'm saying this is a separate proceeding.

22

It's a GRAMA proceeding.

23

proceeding, and it does not.
Here's the, here's the other important point, '£our

24
25

This is not a Merit Commission

Honor.

In order for me to get an appe al of the Merit
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1

Commission, what is the Court above the Merit Commission going

2

to do?

3

the Merit Commission to see if the Merit Commission did it

4

right.

5

get into the record?

6

appeal.

7

It's going to look to see, look to the record before

If I don't have information of this stuff, how does it
And all of a sudden it's not available on

It's not there.

It's not part of the record.

Here's the other thing that's fundamentally very

8

important, Your Honor, the matter's, the information that they

9

have provided to the Merit Commission [inaudible].

First of

10

all, it is not complete.

They didn't provide everything they

11

agreed to.

12

more importantly, as she conceded, it's only major discipline.

13

Well, how is that at all going to be careful, if you really

14

think about it, why, and it's not going to be helpful for this

15

reason.

16

was imposed, then all they have is major discipline cases to

17

compare to our case, which is major discipline, and therefore,

18

it would invariably result in them finding a fair treatment.

19

What they have not provided are the cases involving minor

20

discipline, and those are going to be the most probative.

21

Because if the conduct is similar to that of Mr. Young's, but

22

the party received minor discipline, then Mr. Young's

23

discipline sits disproportionate to the discipline received in

24

that case, and that case becomes very relevant.

25

the Merit Commission may, may disclose this stuff to me in the

The Merit Commission letter establishes that.

But

If all they have are cases in which major discipline

Why?

So even though

34

1

course of the proceedings there, they can only disclose what

2

they have, and what they have is only major discipline, not the

3

minor discipline.

4

filed the objection and the motion to continue that resulted in

5

the letter that I've attached as an exhibit to the Reply.

6

didn't provide everything they would provide.

7

That's the other problem, and that's why I

They

Ms. Wilde also says, Well, I'm on a fishing

8

expedition.

9

cases involving similar conduct, because after all that's what

10

I was very clear, Your Honor, I'm only asking for

the examination is limited to.

11

She says, Well, wait a second, Lucas deals with a

12

different standard than what we got to deal with here.

It may

13

be worded differently, Your Honor, but what it also says in

14

total is the punishment has to be fair and consistent, and when

15

you look at Lucas, that means, you know, it's plain reading,

16

that means you got to look to other case to see.

17

just look at this one case to say whether it was fair and

18

consistent, because you have nothing else to measure against.

19

Furthermore, Your Honor, the privacy interest, I, I

You can't

20

can appreciate the privacy interest in this information I'm

21

requesting.

22

information.

23

involved, at all.

24

either.

25

that the investigation, investigative results of the conduct

Clearly, some of it may be sensitive private
But I don't need the names of the parties
I don't need the source of the information

All I need is the conduct that was alleged and invest,

35

1

and the discipline imposed.

I'm not on a fishing exp - I've

2

limited my request to similar cases and I' ve asked for the

3

conduct and the discipline imposed.

4

Because that's what make, those, those be the only records that

5

would be relevant.

Very narrow.

Why?

I mean the bottom line is this, Your Honor, well, let

6
7

me touch upon a few, just address briefly.

She says we weren't

8

timely.

9

That, it says you have 30 days after a governmental entity to

I think I've adequately briefed that in our reply.

10

respond to the records by either providing the request for

11

records or denying.

12

20th.

We filed this action on May 16th.
THE COURT: [inaudible] cite statute limitations she

13
14

They, they filed the response on April

reviewed?
MR. NAKAMURA: Well, no, I'm just, I'm just saying

15
16

it's a little further than that.

And I answered it a little

17

bit.

18

period.

19

days, because we didn't respond within five days as required by

20

the statute and the statute says if you don't respond in five

21

days it can be taken as a denial, and therefore she says your

22

35 days ran from that beginning, when you filed that request,

23

because we didn't respond.

24

you, particularly the word between subsection (i) and

25

subsection (iii) it has the word or in it.

Clearly under subsection (i) we are within the time
Now she relied upon subsection (2) to say it's 35

But when you look at the statute

So you can do it
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1

under subsection (i) or subsection (2) or subsection (3), or

2

furthermore, look at subsection (3). It specifically refers to

3

that statute that says if they don't respond in five days it's

4

a denial.

5

what was contemplated by subsection 2, they would have said it,

6

because they said it in subsection 3.

7

to go that far, because it's an alternative statute, and we

8

filed within 30 days after response, period.

9

within the time frames provided by statute.

10

Subsection 3 specifically refers to that.

If that's

But you don't even have

We fit, we fit

They contend that there is no authority, also, to

11

order the disclosure of the disciplinary records, and the

12

reasoning on this is really quite simple when you look at the

13

statutes that are provided.

14

restricted under Title 17. Well, when you go to title 63-2 or

15

63-2-201(3)(b) it says the following records are not public.

16

Records to which access is restricted pursuant to, among other

17

things, a state statute.

18

Title 17, it's restricted from disclosure under 63-2-201(3)(b).

19

She says, Well, now you have to find an independent authority,

20

which there is none, to order the disclosure of that.

21

it's restricted.

22

says, and I've read it already, where access is restricted by

23

rule, statute, or regulation referred to in subsection 63-2-

24

201(3) (b), the same one that they're relying upon to restrict

25

the Deputy Merit Commission stuff, the court has authority

They're saying, Hey, they're

So therefore, if it's restricted by

Now that

But when you go back to 63-2-202(7) (e) it
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1

independent of this Chapter 2 order disclosure.

2

how to read that in any other fashion.

3

to the statute and the specific subsection and says that

4

they're relying on, to say that that Title 17 restricts that

5

information, it specifically refers to that and says no the

6

court has authority to order that disclosure.

7

Court has the authority to order the disclosure.

8
9

I don't know

It specifically refers

Clearly the

Again, bottom line, Your Honor, this, this is
fundamental [inaudible].

We're in administrative litigation

10

before a board, the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission Board.

11

There's two issues here.

12

this information to address that issue.

13

The GRAMA provides a means for me to discover that information,

14

and when you go through the statutory analysis required of this

15

Court to order disclosure, considering the balancing test

16

analysis, considering the need for the information against the

17

reasons to restrict it, clearly the needs outweigh the reason

18

to restrict it.

19

there's restrictions on disclosure then, redact any of the

20

sensitive private information.

21

left with is facts and the discipline, and that's all I need,

22

and he's entitled to that.

23
24

On the second issue I clearly need
I'm entitled to it.

When you consider, because the court can also,

You redact all that, all I'm

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, it says [inaudible]
that why should I not grant his motion to give this information

25 I and force him to go back before Merit Commission and, and the
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1

Merit Commission may deny his relief.

Then he has to come back

2

to this court again, get the information and I grant then.

3

shouldn't I grant it now?

Why

4

MS. WILDE: Because I believe that the Deputy

5

Sheriff's Merit Commission has a right to determine how he will

6

receive his due process.

7

their policies in order to get due process.

8

necessary to balance, and they are going to release those

9

records that they believe are necessary, and then for the

What records are necessary under
What records are

10

Court's information 17-30-20 allows an appeal to the district

11

court and they would be reviewing under a different standard.

12

Right now before this Court you're reviewing under

13

the Government Records Access Management Act and you're

14

weighing and balancing Mr. Young's need for the record versus

15

the department's statements that these records are private and

16

that third parties fourth amendment interest may be contained

17

in these records.

18

interests on investigative files, on disciplinary records.

19

believe he is not entitled to the records, nor do I believe,

20

and I will be making the same argument to the Deputy Sheriff's

21

Merit Commission that they cannot release the actual

22

disciplinary records of officers that have not appealed their

23

discipline.

You're weighing and balancing those

24

Now they may determine that they can release the

25

facts and not the actual records, or they may make some in

I
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1

between determination, and the sheriff would have then a right

2

at the conclusion of the proceedings to appeal to district

3

court, under 17-30-2, whichever party believes that they are

4

deprived.

5

point in time there would be an actual denovo hearing, just

6

like they did in Lucas, the case cited by Mr. Nakamura.

7

determined in Lucas that they had a hearing that did not

8

comport with due process.

9

determined that information that should have, should have been

But it's a different standard of review.

At that

They

They, the, and the, and the court

10

provided was not.

11

Lucas would be utilized by the District Court in reviewing due

12

process concerns.

13

So the same standard utilized in Lucas,

I believe that the due process concerns are

14 I absolutely premature.

We do not, we're, we're presuming a

15

denial of due process by the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission

16

prior to even the start of the hearing.

17

believe that that is just absolutely premature.

18

THE COURT: Okay, I'll, I'll, does that take place

19

every day in criminal cases?

20

process and get the, the information?

21

You know, and I

That you have to anticipate due

MS. WILDE: Well, let me note for the Court, Your

22

Honor, which I have not discussed previously, 63-2-207

23

specifically deals, and this is a GRAMA section talking about

24

how it, how it is the other records through discovery, etc.,

25

etc., would prevail, and that is what I'm saying.

That these

1

administrative processes cannot be brought in on a GRAMA

2

request and, and you can't piggy back and say we're being

3

denied our discovery request in a civil case, so we're going to

4

come into this Court under a GRAMA request.

5

GRAMA, Mr. Young's rights under GRAMA, my rights under GRAMA,

6

exist independent of any civil, administrative or criminal

7

proceeding going on.

8

public documents.

9

have a civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding to go to.

The purpose of GRAMA is to give access to

That's independent of whether you actually

10

You have a right to public documents.

11

GRAMA.

12

discovery processes.

13

Your rights under

That's the purpose of

It is not designed to circumvent these other civil

Courts don't want to be in the position, you don't

14

want to have a hundred people marching into your courtroom on a

15

GRAMA request saying I'm in a civil slip and fall accident and

16

I think I need records that have been denied under my, my

17

request for discovery.

18

concerns are not GRAMA concerns.

19
20
21

THE COURT:

Those records are, those types of

Section 63-2-404 of the judicial review

of this, is that a review of the GRAMA?
MS. WILDE:

That is a review of GRAMA, and weighing

22

and balancing Mr. Young's request "I want the records for an

23

administrative hearing" versus the Department's.

24

THE COURT:

Do you think this comes into play after

25

the Merit Commission hearing?

1

MS. WILDE:

No.

2

THE COURT:

Well then why can't -

3

MS. WILDE:

After -

4

THE COURT:

- why, why can't on subsection 8 I

5

proceed here today and grant his request?
MS. WILDE:

6

Because you would need to be making the

7

presumption that he's going to be denied due process.

We don't

8

know that the Merit Commission is not going to give him

9

disciplinary files, and I would argue, Your Honor, that

10

internal affairs files are irrelevant to his proceedings and

11

are not necessary.

12

Commission to determine whether those records are necessary for

13

due process before them.

14

conditions are for the sheriff to establish his burden,

15

improving discipline.

16

people up and testify.

17

discipline.

18

cross-examining the sheriff when he gets on the stand to

19

testify, or whoever testifies on his behalf about discipline

20

imposed by the sheriff's office.

21

can be provided with due process short of receiving these

22

records.

23

And it is for the Deputy Sheriff's Merit

They understand what those five

The sheriff is going to need to put
It is only the sheriff who can impose

There's nothing that prevents Mr. Young from

There are many ways that he

THE COURT: And the only way he can come back before

24

this Court is to prove that he's denied due process then?

25

MS. WILDE: Right, or, or to just simply appeal.

He

1

has a ri<jht to appeal that determinati on. Right.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MS. WILDE: Thank you, Your Honor.

4

THE COURT: Now Mr. Nakamura, this is your motion.

5

You have the .last sa;/. Anything?
MR. NAKAMURA: I appreciate that, Your Honor, and I

6
7

appreciate it that the extent, the extent of the effort to

8

which you're going to, to cover this issue here.
Her statement that we're not entitled to this

9
10

information because by giving it you would be presuming that

11

there would be a violation of his due process rights at the

12

hearing is wholly incorrect, and this is the reason.

13

based upon a presumption.

14

information.

15

right that's being taken away has a right to information before

16

they go to the hearing where that's challenged.

17

proceeding, pre-trial a defendant has a right, a due process

18

right, to the State's evidence.

19

based on presumption of a violation of his due process rights

20

in trial.

21

pre-trial is a right based upon the proceeding that he or she

22

is headed to.

23

It's not

It's based upon a right to have that

Just like any other party who has a due process

In a criminal

Has a right to it.

It's not

That may be the premise of it, but the reason for a

They want to contend.

Well, when you get there hey, you can protect his due

24

process rights by cross examining the sheriff.

You can call

25

any other deputies that you may have wind of who's involved in
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1

something like this.

2

a fishing expedition I don't know what would be.

3

I wouldn't have any information from which to cross examine

4

him.

5

Furthermore, I don't know the specific deputies.

6

the, the real facts of those other cases.

7

and rumor, and that's it.

8

this deputy was involved in this conduct, resulting in this

9

discipline.

10
11

You can subpoena them.

Now if that's not
I don't know.

I'd have to go all over the board with that.
I don't know

I'm hearing innuendo

I don't have solid information that

That's indeed what the information I'm requesting

has.
And, and I guess what I'm, what is a very, troubling

12

to me, is that somehow the defense is saying, Well, you know,

13

there's a way in which you can kind of, in the back end protect

14

the rights.

15

I'm entitled to this information up front.

That's not the way the system works, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: I've heard that.

17

MR. NAKAMURA: And it's, it'll be gone by then, and

18

I'm willing to, and there, if we, if the Court would like extra

19

briefing on that I'd be happy to do it.

20

provision that allows this Court, or any other court, to review

21

a Merit Commission's determination on access to records or not.

22

What it does allow is for us to review the conduct of the Merit

23

Commission after it's done.

24

it's limited to the record.

25 J

I'm not aware of any

That's an appellate review, but

THE COURT: Well, let me indicate to you that the
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1

Court did spend considerable time yesterday in going over these

2

statutes and looking at them, and I'll, I really confess that

3

they're not, not my every day reading of these things. You

4

don't run into this every day as far as sitting on the bench.

5

It's something more of a specialized area, and I got a fairly

6

good knowledge of them, and you certainly enlightened, given me

7

more enlightenment here today as far as this Merit Commission

8

and the GRAMA statutes and so forth are concerned.

9

And my immediate reaction in this case has been that

10

the, the administrative remedies have not been exhausted and

11

that the plaintiff should go back as far as the Merit

12

Commission is concerned and have a hearing and yet I cannot get

13

around the basic understanding that in any case a person is

14

entitled to due process up front.

15

criminal case a person can go to trial without receiving due

16

process and receive the discovery and the information, and even

17

if I deny the request, allow it go back, then it's just going

18

to come back here before, again, if due process is alleged and

19

then, of course, then he has the burden of proving that due

20

process was not granted.

21

I can't understand how in a

I'll/ the Court is of the opinion and I so rule that

22

the plaintiff is entitled to the records asked for and I

23

specifically say, as asked for, with the material redacted.

24

think the right of privacy is more, more important in this

I

25 J situation than the due process of the plaintiff, and if there's
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1

any information that is going to disclose who these infer, the

2

other officers were, I, of course I want that definitely out.

3

I want it strictly as to what the charge was and the result

4

and, and if it comes down to cases that are sensitive or

5

there's been one case where it would be revealing immediately

6

to fellow officers as to who they're talking about, I don't

7

want that given.

8

so be it.

9

If I have to have an in camera hearing, then

But I'll, I want the right of privacy protected.
MR. NAKAMURA: And, Your Honor, I don't know if we can

10

build this into the order or not, and I appreciate that, but,

11

you know, what we're, what we're doing here I think is going to

12

protect that.

13

protective order to preclude the dissemination of this.

14

more importantly, the hearing before the commission we're not

15

going to agree to be public.

16

and so, you know, and that's I guess, you know, the other

17

reason behind this is that I'm not, I'm not interested in

18

private information and the proceeding that we're going into,

19

where this information is going to be used is not public, so -

20

Number one, I'm willing to enter into a

THE COURT:

But

So it's not going to be public,

Well, I'm just saying that I think the

21

right of privacy is of greater interest to protect than the due

22

process to plaintiff at this point, and I want that protected.

23

Who's going to prepare an Order?

24 j

MR. NAKAMURA: I'd be happy to prepare it.

25

THE COURT: Thank you counsel.
46

MR. NAKAMURA: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'm
going to be making a motion for fees in this, to be awarded in
this case, under the GRAMMA provision that allows prevailing
to, prevailing party to be awarded attorney's fees necessary,
or that were incurred in perfecting this appeal, and I can, if
the Court wants to spend time on that or hear that or we just,
if the Court just wants to entertain motions when they're filed
we can do that as well.
THE COURT: Well, you make the motion and I will give
you a hearing.
MR. NAKAMURA: Thank you.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

23
24
25
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ADDENDUM D

08/07/01

THE 15:10 FAX 801 468 2172

SLCo PERSONNEL

BEFORE T H E DEPUTY SHERIFFS-MERIT COMMISSION
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H

BRENT YOUNG,
DECISION ON IN-CAMERA REVIEW OF
COMPARABLE DISCIPLINARY CASES.

Appellant,
-vsSALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Case No. 00-1

Agency.

A request for the Deputy Sheriffs-Merit Commission (hereinafter Commission) to
perform an in-camera review of disciplinary cases comparable to the circumstances of the
Brent Y o u n g appeal w a s made on February 6, 2 0 0 0 and March 12, 2 0 0 1 by the
Appellant. The Commission met on Wednesday, April 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 to perform the in-camera
review. Commission members J . Richard Catten and Jill Carter were present. The
C o m m i s s i o n , having reviewed the disciplinary records furnished by t h e Sheriff's Office,
hereby s u b m i t s the following findings:
FINDINGS
1.

That t h e records provided by the Sheriff's Office appeared to be complete and
included cases relating back to the beginning of the current Sheriff's administration.

2.

That t h e none of the cases reviewed by the Commission are relevant to the above
captioned case and, therefore, would be of no value to the Appellant in the defense of
this appeal,
ORDER
It is hereby ordered by the Commission that none of the records reviewed by the

Commission shall be released to the Appellant.
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TUE 15:11 FAX 801 468 2172

DATED this 2%

day of

SLCo PERSONNEL
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_, 2 0 0 1 .

Catten, Chair

ialazar, Vice-Chair
Vic^fchair
Paul D. Salazar,
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Sheriff Aaron Kennard
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2001 S. State
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Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 9 0
Susan Biesele
Human Resource Director
2001 South State Street # S 2 7 0 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 9 0
Brent D. Young
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Blake A. Nakamura
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PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
63-2-101- Short title.
Thli chapter i s known as the "Government Records Access and
Management Act."
83-2-102. L e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t .
(1) In enacting t h i s a c t , the Legislature recognizes two
IwvdajEonWl constitutional rights i
)£e^ »he JfjLght o l pAXyalgy fa "frftlafcleaP ee posaenal J a t o
yfrtefWfcfrU- *-^w^—*^
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23
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28
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'frthtwQy •qgyfnwttWe tt?Ufri«t7

1 2 1 ffh? iBqlalaUzs
algg yegggniiefi ft PttfrUc WliffY tat?mti An
allowing government t o treat certain records c o n f i d e n t i a l l y ,
pa s p e c i f i e d in thiy ?hapWi i?y th? WMl9OT9ti(42) I t i s the intent of the Legislature t o i
f<y •eew.felleh faig infogmatiofi praotlooo fco proMont abuoo of
yoesonal information by goveriwonfral <H»frittioo while
yreiieoiiing tho public's right of oacy end roaconable
a0000c to unroefcrifltod evbiis rooordo; and
(b) provkdo guidelines of eeomioss- *e •go^ornroont Information
end privacy of poraoival infegmetien sonciofronfr with
nationwide ettai*dasd» »
JjQ) promote the public's right of easv and reasonable access
t o unrestricted public records;
$h) provide clrna^ standards specifying those conditions
under which the public eelAey interest in allowing the
confidential treatment of records outweighs the public's

ensqstrt In ass*??;
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l£l prevent abuse of confidentiality bv governmental
? P U * 1 «frYPOTHetteBQ confidential treatment of ycortft
only ae provided in this Chapter;
fd^ provide guidelines for both disclosure and
confidentiality of government records, which are based
on the equitable weighing of the pertinent Interests,

4$
41

information practices; and
<*) e s t a b l i s h f a i r and reasonable records management
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63-2-103. Definitions . _ > ^ t^"!)
-+- f/7o4- JLtco*
As used i n t h i B j ^ a p t S T T <
^
^
*"^0 '
H i ^Audlt^rfiSans a systematic examination of financial records
f o r the purpose of determining their accuracy or the
ftffCTWPY
<?l rplttttv rW9rt> QF flta;ement;g, 9? a *ygtemat;Lc
examlnaticn of program procedures and operations for the

H.B. 400, (as proposed), General Session (1992), Chapter 280, Laws of Utah (1992)
pages 2-8 and 20-60 omitted.

Section 63-2-201
1
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from a governmental entity, and/if the records are contained
in files that do not contain redorda that are exempt from
disclosure, the governmental entity mayi
(a) provide the requester with the facilities for copying
the requested records and require that the requeater
sake the copies himself; or
(b) allow the requester to provide his own copying
facilities and personnel to make the copies at the
governmental entity's offices/^and valve the fees for
^
copying the records.
y
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fIOWA governmental entity that owns a copyright or patent
affecting a record*/ and that offers the copyrighted or
patented record for sale may control by ordinance or policy
the access, duplication, and distribution of the material
based on terms the governmental entity considers to be in
the public interest.Wwothing in this chapter shall be
construed to limit oiHunpair the rights or protections
granted to the governmental entity under federal copyright
or patent law as a result of its ownership of the copyright
or patent.
63-2-202. Access to private, oonfidontial controlled, end
protected documents.
(1) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a private
record that ie olaoslflod privevo to:
(a) the subject of the record;
(b) the parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor
who is the subject of the record;
(c) the legal guardian of a legally incapacitated individual
who is the subject of the record;
(d) any other individual who:
(!)
has a power of attorney from the subject of the
record; or
(li)
submits a notarised release from the subject of
the record or his legal representative dated no
more than 30 days before the date the request is
made; or
(e) any person who Has s to whom the record must be provided
pursuant to court order as provided in subsection (71
signed by a judgo from a Utah sour*, efthoc then a

42
43
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* Government interests request that the following language be
substituted: M A governmental entity that owns a copyright er A
patent, trade secret, or other form of intellectual property and
that offers the same sffeeting a roeord,—and the* efiers %ho
eopygightod o* petontod sooesd for sale or license may...." Media
interests request that the word "access" be deleted as follows:
" •. .may control by ordinance or policy the seeees, duplication... . *
9

i.,.4 ^.Ts< " tyf*

/
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Section 63-2-202
jeetiee ef the petea eoeytj eg e fodssal eoe** ef
n'
eonpetaet jueiedietisw te the aw taut that the eeeerd
^^
deals with a wetter i* eontrovearay tv>f which tho eouyfr i j / \ *
has Jiu»lediotiafi aftss tho seest has eoneldosod the . )& ^&4 j ^
soglts of the geaerd sequost.
VQ/ (-^|>/* '
(a) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a
/
iftP^tfj;|^4 As eleaaifiad eo»fidonfci^l ^controlled record
(i)

a physician, paychologiat, or-eertlTQ^-social
worker upon submission of a notarixecreleaae
frota the subject of the record that is dated no
store than 30 days prior to the date the request
is made and a signed acknowledgment of the terms
of disclosure of eenfidontial gontrolled
information as provided by Subsection (b); and
{11}
any person who has a to whom the record must be
provided pursuant to court order as provided in ^ >
»T?frwU9ft P I sigtvod by a judyo fws* a Utah
""Z/'^Vu*
eomrty ether than a j*otioo of tho poaoo eosstf yfy »^
er a federal oourtof eonpotont jurisdiction to lr^ / *?
the extern* that the reoord deals wish a mattog In v i^^ 0
controversy ever whioh the oourt has jurisdiction
after the eeust hso oeneaderod tho e>oi?ita of the
goserd request«
(b) A person who receives a record from a governmental
entity in accordance with Subsection (2)(a)(1) may not
disclose confidential controlled information from that
record to any person, including the subject of * the
record *
II %t\tt* Hftfrf**hftn ?"« street gjf g prjvg^e Q?T coptCTU^d
record, the portion of the record that pertains to another
fttfrlm »ft*iU fr* g?qpeffate4 ttW th« P9JTU9* &** thf
requester is entitled to inspect.
Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a
protected record that is oiaaeifiod mm pgotootod tot
(a) the person who submitted the infowwation 1* the record;
(b) any other individual whoi
(i)
has a power of attorney fro» the subjoot ef the
« e e e e * ftU ffrt»fr»POTWIi ,.»ytaTfltntPl entj^Qfi.
Or PQlitJCill ffyfr3ivm<W*f *ftW*« ^ e y e s t * yqy*
sought t o frs pg<rt?cfre<a PY %\* p y y t e ^ f d
g l a s s i f i s a U g f l ; or
(ii)
submits a notarised release from {lie subjeet ef
tho lrooord a l l frf tho persona f governmental
. f l f t a U f t i PT p o e t i c a l MMiYiU9Pi
*h9Eft
I n t e r e s t s were sought t o be protected by the
protected c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , or M e fra* thSig leg**
representatives, dated no more than 30 days prior
t o the date the request i s made; or
10

Section 63-2-202
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f4+
XJJJ. A governmental entity may disclose a private, controlled or
protected record olaosifled pg*MatOj oenfirientialj er
pgefcootod to another governmental entity, another atatev the
United States, or a foreign government only aa provided by
Section 63-2-206-
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(S* Before releasing a privatef controlled, or protected record
elaosifiod pgivato, oorvfldontialr or protootod, the
governmental entity shall obtain evidence of the requester's
identity.
-f-6+ lathing in this aootion prshibltc a gOMognmontal outlay from
dioolocing a rooogd to pogaono other than those llaaod in
Cebaootionc (1)# (3), aivd (3)if the fevogfunonteal entity
-ylotogauiftOP that diooloauga la in the eublio lutoyoeti
r7i9lA governmental entity shall disclose a record pursuant to
the terms of a court order stoned bv a judoe from a court of
^ competent jurisdiction, provided that:
i SAX the record deals with a matter in controversy over which
the court has jurisdiction:
^ Xkl the court has considered the merits of the request for

31
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<(l X£l the court has c?fls|c>p^ a ^ t W\e?eftppr9P*iUt*tM»ti*
pyPY^f i<?n fay Ufflit«,U9P* 91ft frh* ttfff
frirf, 4jirffclt9*¥re frf
v
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(c) any person who hag a to whom the record must be provided
greWHM* t9 court order as provided in subsection f 71
eiynod by a judgo iron a Utah eesrtj -ether than a
jestiee ef tho eoeoo oourt, eg a lodoral ooegt ef
esispetofit jurisdiction te the eatant that tho eeeegd
ek>ale »»ith a mattog in controversy ovsg whiek the oourt
hao jurisdiction after tho eenst has eensidorod the
sprite ef the gooosd goqecat*

TN> r^coyd fa ?r^ey jo p m r n Prt fl9v inttrtftt in $hf
pa^f 9iE PrtYfrt? par fipnttreUtti r*99rti»i frysjneya
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c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y I n t e r e s t s in the case of
n

T*COT4*

gm*<^gti gmter SgsUsn ^3-2-30^111 anc* (3i. os ths

37
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/ hi
public I n t e r e s t In the case of other protected records;
K
-~SjM t o the extent; tlye jpfcpyd \B prgpfrty PlMftljEUd p r i v a t e
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considering l i m i t a t i o n s thereon, o u t w i c h the i n t e r e s t s
f A )
favoring yeftrtrtUffi 9f «9ce»?t JgSP
(jr/iJfcl t9 the extent excess jp pmrj.ctged by a r^flf, prtfrr,
7
s t a t u t e oy rtg^UT49^ yafrspyed to jr\ Smlfflft 6 3 - 2 2Plf3U*Of tft* CTWtt tW OTtlWrttT liufrpfftdep* 9f tfrjs
jfrct %p pyder d i s c l o s u r e ,
111 i l l A governmental e n t i t y may d i s c l o s e or authorise
d i s c l o s u r e of private or controlled records for research.
purposes i f the governmental e n t i t y :
(1)
determines that the research purpose cannot
reasonably be accomplished
without use or
11

39

sftnwUjti 9i ,pg9t§stf4i tftt tntwtttf gangling i g c ^ f i .

8«ction 63-2-202
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

disclosure of the Information to the researcher
Ull

determlnea that the proposed reaearch ia bona
fide, and tftat th« vfllue 9* th« rff'ff^ygh
PUtw»iqha the infringement qppn pergonal Privacy?
liiil recuires the researcher to assure the integrity,
confidentiality, and security of the records and
f*** t ° remove or destroy the individual
Identifiers associated with the records as soon
as the purpose of the research project has been
flccgpiplliiiedi
jjy)
prohibits the researcher from disclosing the
record In individually id«wt€TfTable form, excent
v
as provided in Subsectlofr-f S U b l H f f trom using—- (YJl
the record for purposes other tXan the research
approved bv the governmenta1 entity:
m.
aecures from the researcher a written statement
of, hill mderstandlng of and, agreementfroti>f
conditlona of this aubaectlon and his

20

undemanding that viQ-laUw of the torn* of tM»

21
22
23
24
25
2*
27
28
29

agreement may subject him to criminal prosecution
under Section 63-2-B01.
Ski A researcher mav disclose a record in individually
Identifiable form if the record is disclosed for the
purpose of auditing or evaluating the research program
and no subsequent use or disclosure of the record in
individually Identifiable form will be made bv the
auditor or evaluator except as provided bv this section.
(c\ A governmental entity may require indemnification as a

30
32
33
34
35
36
37
18

47
48

condition of permitting gtmrgh under ttut •wbgegtign€3-2-203. Fees.
__
{1) A governmental entity may charge a^re'asonable fee,
to cover the governmental entity's aetuai^cost of
duplicating a record or compiling-S-Tecord in a 5form other
than that maintained by the governmental" entity^.
H I TS99 shallfef•gtflPUfhfd *• follows i
(a) Governmental entities with budgets established by the
9
Government Interests have proposed the following
substitute: "A oo^ernS8n*al entity may charge a reasonable fee^
" 4ect—to subsection f 4 u to cover the governmental entity's
actual cost, o^ k 4a&rchlno /for a record, duplicating a record^.
eeoxeaatlnofe rec&nr«ewraifant to Sectlon6 3-2-307. or compiling a
form other than that maintained by the governmental
ireuant to Section 63-2-201f 8 H b K
?n addition,! a,
governmental entity mav charge a reasonable fee to cover the
governmental entity's actual coat of review, when the record is
f t m t W l fog 9 commercial purpose."

is

b)

Section 63-2*203
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

.

Legislature eub«>oot te Ceet4en 63 38 3 ahall eatabliah
fees Moing a eeet fermute dotogminod by end tn
y^jrjft^
eonjunction with the Office el Planning and gwdgot a»d rjJD o T
t h e Pivision of ?inaaeo through the budget process..
• A* V
<b) Political subdivisions ahall eatabliah feea b y ordinance \ Q \
o r written formal policy adopted bv the governing body.
<cj T h e judiciary ahall eatabliah feea b y rulea of t h e
.fc>,Vl4l

^

»-l«U»««U.

^

V

10
11
12
13
14
15

/31 A governmental entity m a y fulfill a request without charge' y p ^ s f i
when it determines thati
\rJ^
(a) releasing t h e record primarily benefits rhe public
v^
rather than an individual a person? or
(b) the individual requesting the record ia the eubject o f
the record, o r an Individual specified in Section 6 3 - 2 -

1?
18
19
20
21

+£*
M l A governmental entity m a y not charge a fee for?
{a) reviewing a record to determine whether it ia subject to
disclosure; o r
(b) inspecting a record. 4

is

?P?(i> oy f ? } t a* apwgpgatft^*

22

+**?<*}

23
24
25
26
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30
31

X i i u ^ A i l money r o o d Mod b y a steto agoney t o O O V O J tho aetual
ooct of duplicating a rooord o r oompillng a rooord in a form
othog than that maintained by t h o stafco.agoney fees received
yndfr this section b v a governmental entity subject t o
subsection f 2 w a i ahall be retained by the^afato agonoy
governmental entity a s a dedicated credit Ipkhomm
funds /
shall b e used t o recover the actual cost a n a expensed
incurred by the state ageeey governmental entity in
providing the requested record or record aeries.
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* Government interests have proposed the following languages
l & ± If $ Ttqw»«* Is made fpy a npfl-ftfflnq>ercjlal p\OT9??t * *
governmental entity may not charge a fee fori
(a) xil yovlowing its review of a record to determine whether it
la subject t o disclosure; « *
«$** 1 1 1 1
inspecting a geeoad s e a l i n g foy a W M r * i If
jgsa frhan oi|efroqyp?y ,rtgyt#tt 9f

39
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illli

»«qr»q«UM * rreort. If l?w than wre ho^r ires

request.
fpy purpoaqg p* thj,g s ^ s e c t ^ r ^ ftU CTWIIttf sqtoftj^yl by ,§
requester t o a s i n g l e governmental e n t i t y within a 30 day
period s h a l l be considered a single request.
l £ l ft qoytnmTO^-Jt e n t i t y fray ftp* Sh«q* & lf« for s e a l i n g j?Q3r
a record or for aegreoatlnq a record pursuant to Section S3-2307 i f the Individual requesting the record i s the subject of
the record, or an individual specified in Section 63-2-202J I)
pr (21,.
13

IM

/
r

3

If f « « are i m w c u d to «xc«ed sso or If the r a o u a a f r ha a

4

mrt r#i<il <^ff f r?m pr«vloviff r«qvtg*f.

Anv pypftl4 »*>QM?n in

5
£
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
**

rg\
ill *hia taction doea not altar. r^*x:H5r~>^duca apply *e fees
aatablishad by othar eaa*Mttae^lecrlalation A *p
63-2-204. Requests — Time linit for^rirapoinfa and extraordinary
circumstances«
(1) A parson making a request for a racord shall furnish the
governmental entity with a written request containing his
name, nailing address, daytime telephone number XI
javallabfr|# and a description of the records requested that
identifies the record with reaaonable specificity* — &
feMOFWuontal outlay stay goeoend so aw anal goeuost or othe*
I91SW*
soaeiaod f»fr-*-fyi
in Gubseeaien m h*% e*sh lesponoo c h » U *0% be

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

(2) A governmental entity may make rules in accordance with
Chapter 46a, Title 63, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act,
specifying where and to whom requests for acceaa shall be
directed.
(3) ,<el gneopa ea provided in SabeootAea (4) f a gau's»iiiio*ial
entity oha11 soapend to e eoaoada roquoat no lator than
ton business daye affray aeeeiviiie; the roquoat byi Within
10 dava after receiving a written request, or within 5

29
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34
35
36
37
38
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41
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44
45
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47
4*
43
50

« « » « of *»*» due ahall ba rttumid to tha r e m o t e r .

dftYg rf receiving * yrtfflm,imm i-t th? yeguestpr
demonstrates that expedited response to the request of
the record benefit* the public rather than a person, the
qyytpipiTOm W U t V JhfrU, r«gP9ftd p? tfr* request; fry?
(#1) approving the request and providing the record;
f M i ) denying the request;
f*lli \ notifying the requester that it does not maintain
the record and providing, if known, the name and
address of the governmental entity that does
maintain the record; or
(4iv) notifying the requester that because of one of
the extraordinary circumstances listed in
Subsection <fS4»(4). it cannot immediately approve
or deny the request, describing the circumstance
relied upon, and specifying the earliest time and
date when the records will be available.
Xbl fltxv oeraon who requests a record to obtain information
for t rteSY n SW9tt fol WWaCPUoq oy byoadsm *9
the general public is presumed to be actino to benefit
ttVft PVfrU? ratfrey %h*P E Pqg*9fti
ft) If a sequester doawnetyatoo14that ho la a mombor of the nowo
media ^eg that enped**ed eo*e*eo of the rooord bone4ifrc tho

Section 63-2-204

a
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
S
ID
11
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

pebllo gat-hog %hen an individual, the fSMegnmsnfcal entity
•hall soogend \o a sesesdo seqeos* no Into* than five
feuclnooo dayo eftor eooolving the eeqeesi»
The following circumatancee constitute "extraordinary
circumstances- that allow a governmental antlty to delay
approval or denial by an additional nemboe »f days period of
l£ffl£ as specified in Subsection 63-2-204 4*+(5\ if the
governmental entity determines that due to the extraordinary
circumstances it cannot respond within the time limits
provided in Subsection (3) or{4)t
(a) another governmental entity is using the record, in
which case the originating governmental entity shall
Aiwiiodiafcely promptly request that the governmental
entity currently in possession return the record;
(b) another governmental entity Is using the record as part
of an audit and returning the record before the
completion of the audit would impair the conduct of the
audit;
(c) the request is for a voluminous quantity of records;
(d) the governmental entity is currently processing a large
number of records requests;
{«} the request requires the governmental entity to review a
large number of records to locate the records requested?
(f) the decision to release a record involves legal issues
requiring analysis of statutes, rules, ordinances,
regulationsf or case laws
(g) separating public leforaaslon feem private# eonfidaniiial
eg pgotootod infsrrnafrien secreoatinp information that
the requester is entitled to inspect from information
that the requester is not entitled to inspect requires
extensive editing; or
(h) eopasatoinq pubtio Angogtsation €eosi pglvasoj asnfldeniial
or protootod information segregating information that
the requester is entitled to inspect fFom information
tfftat i?he rfq\;ef%*? ja ngV iliUUfd 19 *»«?••« requires
computer programming^
If a t*****^^
one of the
extraordinary circumstances "listed in Subsection <f£4-H \
precludes approval or denial within the time specified in
Subsection {3) er •(4)^ the following time limits apply to
Government interests have requested the addition of the

n i any effigy *sig?nt sr »xtraor<UftftrY
LlfgmffVfrn<?es[x*gx*phi
that pB *tot
Uftftlv rwwntt %° * r«qm»*t wftere ^ f
a
that
DrWent
OTBcy ****d gfcMItw ,ttwtnte Iwrtwd* twwigy and XH m ^ n t y %g
•respond is assented in good faith, and is not designed
\rhr^^4m^4^r-ist
delay the response.*
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4
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15

the extraordinary circumstances*
(a) for claims under Subsection «f4f(4Hal, the governmental
entity currently in possession of the record shall
return the record to the originating entity within five
business days of the request for the return unless
returning the record would impair the holder's work;
(b) for claims under Subsection *34»MHbi. the originating
governmental entity shall notify the requester when
record is available for inspection and copying;
(c) for claims under Subsections f ^ M H O , (d), and (e);
the governmental entity shall x
(i)
disclose the publie records that it has locate
which the requester is entitled to inspect:
(ii)
provide the requester with an estimate of the
amount of time it will take to finish the

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

complete the eeaseh york and disclose %fe»
eoquootori those records that the requester is
entitled to inspect as soon as reasonably
possible?"*
(d) for claims under Subsection (5){f), the governmental
entity shall either approve or deny the request within
five days after the response (time designated for the
original request has expired yV
<e) for claims under Subsection f5)(g), the governmental
entity shall fulfill the request within 15 business days
from the date of the original request; or
(f) for claims under Subsection (5){h), the governmental
entity shall complete its programming and disclose the
requested records as soon as reasonably possible.

32
33
34
35
36
37
38

JL£l*f/lf
* request for access is submitted to an office of a
*-//governmental entity other than that specified by rule in
accordance with Subsection (2), the office shall immodialkfly
promptly forward the request to the appropriate pffice. Vlf
the request is forwarded imwsdiatoly promotlvjghe time u~"
limit for zMponmm begins when the record is "received by the
office designated by rule.

39
40
41
42

* Government interests have proposed that the extensions for
legirir^Sarysis and for segxegrK^
should be subject to
tha^U^s soon as reasonably possible** standard, along with the new
exigent"CllLiiae-trtrnceB extension pyopnnert In^footnote 7.

43
44
45
46

(iii)

f

Government interests have proposed to add the tern "££
segregated" at this point* This is related to footnote 8.
** Government interests have proposed to delete this and the
following two paragraphs. This proposal relates to footnote 8.
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63-2-205. Denials,
(1) If the governisental entity denies the request in whole or
part, it shall ie»« 4 %*Um»
jToKih %e Iho *oq**n*,*M M
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If the governmental entity fails to provide the requested
records or issue a denial within the specified time period,
that failure is considered the equivalent of a determination
denying access to the records.

(2) The notice of denial shall contain the following
information i
{a) e description of the record or portions of the record to
which access was denied, provided that the description
does not disclose private, eetifidoefclal controlled, or
protected information;
(b) citations to the provisions of this chapter, court rule
or order, another state statute, federal statute, or
federal regulation that exempt the record or portions of
the record from disclosure, provided that the citations
do not disclose private, oonfidontial controlled, or
protected information;
(cj a statement that the requester has the right t o appeal
the denial t o the chief administrative o f f i c e r of the
governmental e n t i t y |hrt fthon Jtff^gifthm »ho eeeordc
seawrffrtroo er dla^trlgV #eert; and
{d} h b r i o ! emmaey *t t&ti *$pG±lii ywo&tQ*, the time l i m i t s
'for f i l i n g an appeal/and the name and business address
of the chief administrative o f f i c e r of the governmental

31
entity.
32
(3) Unless otherwise required by a court or agency of competent
33
jurisdiction, a governmental entity may not destroy or give
34 / ttpj££i&<^yfOf any record to which access was denied until
35
lct"~ •^SeperTod In which to bring anjappeal has expired or the
end of the^sppeale processf including judicial appeal
3*
^fT
37 "
38
€3-2-206. Sharing records.
39
(1) A governmental entity may provide a record eorioe that is
40
elascifiod private, controlled, or protected wndor Section
41
<3 3 303j eenfidonfrlal undo*fioofcionS3 2 303» ppotooted
42
eeder Biibsoefclen t3 2 301 (1) s* (0) to another governmental
43
entity, a e# government-managed corporation, tfhe federal
44
yovernment, or another state if the requesting govoromontal
45
entity er fovornmon* managed eorpeyatleei
46
(a) serves as a repository or archives for purposes of
'(
47
historical preservation, administrative maintenance, or : •
48
destruction;
w •*
49
(b) enforces*. litiqa&mJ or investigates civil or criminal 8%<^
50
law and the record is necessary to a proceeding or
^Jr
17
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If
20
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2*
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investigation; « •
(c) is authorised by state statute to conduct an audit and
the record is needed for that purpoaex_fi£
ISLi is one that collects information for presentence.
probationarattpr parole purposed
(2) A governmental entity may provide a private or controlled
record or record series *hat is slaesiiiod psivaso mat
oenfidoneial to another governmental entity^^jBt
government-managed corporation, the fedaral governmentr or
another state if the requesting go»agnroon*a* entifcyr
^x
,{
(a) certifies that the record or record series is^ecessary^y *f7if"
to the performance of the governmental entity* a duties *
end functions;
(b) certifies that the record or record series will be used
for a purpose similar to the purpose for which the
information in the record or record series was collected
or obtained; and
(c) certifies that the use of the record or record series
produces a public benefit that outweighs the individual
privacy right that protects the record or record series.
(3) A governmental entity may provide a record or record series
that is elaseifioti protected under Subsection 63-2-3p4-^Tp"
or (2) to another governmental entity, a oovernmsntj^anaged\ ) &^~
corporation, the federal,government, or another stalte XTT—*\A*-_, ^V/^
(a) the record i& necessary>to the performance of the
JJ
eovommemal^requesttno entity's duties and functions;
or
(b) the record will be used for a purpose similar to the
purpose for which the information in the record or
record series was collected or obtained.
(syombogoti iwon eld numbs* 6)
JLii^A governmental entity shall provide a private, eenfidonmial
controlled, or protected record to another governmental
entity^uK government-managed corporation, the federal
. government, or another state if the requesting entity;
<v (ar) is entitled by law to Inspect the record; or
tt p**j LB required to inspect the record BB a condition of
participating in a state or federal program or for
receiving state or federal funds.
7 rj
,(jr>vBefore disclosing a record or record series under this
section to another governmental entity, another state, the
United States$ or a foreign government, the originating
governmental entity shall *
t t*) inform the recipient of the record's classification and
the accompanying restrictions on access fend

<Mb) it th* **<;LQiw)% I* no* ft qpYsnwKrrtgl fnUtv to «Msh
this chanter applies, obtain the recipient'*
written
agreement, which mav be by mechanical or electronic
transmission, that it will abide by those restrictions
on access unless a statute, federal regulation, or
18

2
interstate agreement otherwise governs tne snoring ox
2
the record or record series.
3
j*+n**X>ero4 ir+m aid amass* 4)
* £ ffi ttaswlihs^andlftsj Sebeesaieti {2) a A governmental entity may
5
disclose a record to anothar state, tha Unitad States, or a
f
foreign government for tha reasons llatad in Subsections
7
(1), (2), and (3) without complying with the procedures of
8
ittftgreU?** f?l QT 1$) " disclosure is authorized by
9
executive agreement, treaty, federal statute, compact,
10
federal regulation, or state statute.
11 (3 111 A governmental entity receiving a record pursuant to this
1*
Motion is subject to the same restrictions on disclosure of

13

ttt

m?riftl 99 thv grlslM^ng mtttvi

14
«4*p
_
15 i H l j Htotwithetanding any other provision of this aectionj if a
16
Htore specific court rule or order, state statute, federal
17
statute, or federal regulation prohibits or requires sharing
18
information, that rule, order, statute or federal regulation
19
controls.
20
+8+
21 % f9^ The proulolone ef thio sooaion do net apply *o following
22
records may not be shared under this section:
23
(a) records held by the Utah State Tax Commission that
24
pertain to any person and that are gathered under
23
authority of Title 59, Revenue and Taxation;
2$
<b) records held by the TJtah Division of^Oil, Gas and Mining
27
that pertain to any person and Uyjpcare gathered under \j
28
authority of Chapter S, Title 40, Board and Division of
29
Oil, Gas and Mining; and
30
(c) records of publicly funded libraries as described in
31
Subsection 63-2-302 (5).
32 (\ flQ] Ifrgprta th** M T <wrA<IW^ ? r relate ,fr?ftviolation gf ^aw fry
33
i T W I W H L w t t y ffjlffsoi may fry fllaglpsed Xft{A\
35
VV^

n
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Government i n t e r e s t s have proposed the addition of a new
Section 63-2-207i
Requests bv forty Litigants. A request bv a
party l i t i g a n t acalnst the s t a t e , a p o l i t i c a l subdivision, or other:
governmental e n t i t y for records related t o the subject m r t e r of
the UUOTtjon f**&U fttt fre Hfrlfct tg g m t o n s g?-2-?Q3l thfQftgh

42
44
43

state or federal
prpcedVire*

4i

,§2-2-29$ tort ftoU be qgytnwwi fry **>* genmm* prgrHJoq rt .ft**
rules of civil, criminal or administrative
lKs4

•*/» - ...Jr..*

°$£»" H"

ADDENDUM F

2-4-06.03

Responsibility and Authority for Discipline
(1)

Sheriff
The Sheriff may impose any major discipline measure deemed appropriate,
after complying with prescribed procedural requirements of merit or career
service regulations.

(2)

(3)

(4)

Division Commanders
(a)

Division Commanders have the authority to issue verbal and written
warnings.

(b)

Division Commanders may initiate major disciplinary action by
submitting written charges and recommendations of misconduct to the
Sheriff with recommendations for proposed disciplinary action.

(c)

Any discipline initiated against a member as a result of a secondary
assignment, will be completed by the secondary assignment Division
Commander.

(d)

After meeting with the member, and prior to submitting any major
disciplinary action recommendation to the Sheriff, the Division
Commander will consult with the Bureau Chief, the Human Resources
Manager and the Captains Board. The Division Commander is required
to report to the Sheriff in writing that the above consultations have
occurred when submitting a recommendation for major discipline, to
include a summary of the Captain's Board input.

(e)

The Division Commander will submit a written recommendation to the
Sheriff, detailing the violation, and the discipline being sought. Prior to
submittal, the Division Commander will meet with the member and
inform the member of the recommendation.

(f)

The Division Commander or designee will serve the Sheriffs notice of
intent to discipline and the Sheriffs final notice of discipline to the
member.

Supervisors
(a)

Supervisors have the authority to issue verbal and written warnings .
Written warnings must be reviewed and approved by Division
Commanders, through the chain of command, prior to issuance.

(b)

Supervisors may also recommend other disciplinary action by
submitting written reports of misconduct to their Division Commander
through the chain of command.

Publicity of Charges (Sworn)
In the absence of an appeal to the Merit Commission, copies of such charges
shall not be made public without the consent of a charged sworn employee.
(17-30-19, UCA)
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